



**Global  
Partnership**

for Effective Development  
Co-operation

# **Making development co-operation more effective: How development partners are promoting effective, country-led partnerships**

PART II OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 2019 PROGRESS REPORT





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## *Abstract*

This work is a joint publication of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is Part II (of III) of a report that presents the results of the 2018 Monitoring Round of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Part II focuses on how effectively development partners support partner country-led efforts for sustainable development. Data collected by 86 partner countries and territories, in collaboration with more than 100 development partners, serve as the basis of this work and its evidence regarding implementation of the agreed principles of effective development co-operation: country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and mutual accountability. By highlighting where progress has been made and where challenges remain, the work aims to inform how governments and their partners can strengthen collective action towards achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

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## *Foreword*

This is Part II of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 2019 Progress Report. Parts I and II are being released sequentially in advance of the Senior-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership, which will take place on 13-14 July 2019, on the margins of the 2019 United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. Parts I and II present results that have emerged from analysis of data collated for the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round. Global Partnership progress reports enable policy makers to understand trends related to mainstreaming effective development co-operation principles into development co-operation practices at country level, and gain an outlook on key issues for the effectiveness agenda that require action over the coming years.

Parts I and II provide analysis and findings with respect to delivering against internationally agreed effectiveness commitments. The full report will be published in late 2019, and will include a concluding Part III informed by the discussions at the Senior-Level Meeting. Part III will reflect views of Global Partnership stakeholders on the evidence presented in Parts I and II, as well as key messages to further shape the future of the monitoring exercise and effectiveness efforts.

The Global Partnership has produced progress reports since 2014 to generate evidence on implementation of internationally agreed principles for effective development co-operation that demonstrates where progress has been made and where challenges remain. The reports draw on data collated by partner countries and are one of the few sources of aggregate global data and analysis on development co-operation effectiveness. The progress reports are published jointly by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Development Programme. Their aims are to ensure that effectiveness remains high on the international development agenda while also supporting better policy to drive better results where they count most – on the ground.

All data presented herein, unless otherwise stated, are primary information reported by the partner country governments that participated in the Global Partnership's biennial monitoring exercise. Other complementary sources of data used in the report are the latest available data at the time of writing, and are referenced accordingly.

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## *Abbreviations and acronyms*

BUILD	Business Initiative Leading Development
CABRI	Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative
CCS	Country Cooperation Strategy
CPA	Country programmable aid
CRF	Country-owned results framework
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO	Civil society organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCF	Development Cooperation Forum (UN)
FSS	Forward Spending Survey
GNI	Gross national income
HLPF	High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
LDC	Least developed country
MDAs	Ministries, departments and agencies
MDB	Multilateral development bank
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NOD	Nairobi Outcome Document
NFN	NGO Federation of Nepal
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PFM	Public financial management
PPD	Public-private dialogue
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS	Small island developing state
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprise
UMIC	Upper middle-income country
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
USD	US dollar
WHO	World Health Organization

## Part II highlights: How development partners are promoting effective, country-led partnerships

**Development partners' alignment to partner country priorities and country-owned results frameworks is declining.** Development partners increasingly use the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a framework for results around shared objectives. However, alignment of project objectives to partner country priorities has decreased for most development partners, alongside a decreasing reliance on country-defined results, statistics and monitoring systems. With multilateral development banks driving up the average in using country-owned results frameworks (72% in 2018), the decline is most pronounced for bilateral development partners (from 64% in 2016 to 57% in 2018). Accelerated efforts to use country-owned results frameworks, and to use and strengthen national statistics and monitoring systems, will reinforce support for partner countries' policy space and leadership as called for in SDG Target 17.15.

**Increased use of national procurement systems is driving an overall increase in the use of country systems.** Globally, use of country public financial management systems has increased slightly, from 50% in 2016 to 53% in 2018, primarily driven by a notable increase in the use of procurement systems (from 37% in 2016 to 50% in 2018). The data also show that the longer providers are present in partner countries, the higher the share of funds disbursed using country systems. This indicates that using country systems benefits from building institutional knowledge and relies on practice and improvements over time.

**Forward visibility of development partners' co-operation at country level is weakening.** Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round show that, on average, partner country governments had forward visibility and could start medium-term planning on only 56% of the development co-operation funding they expected to receive from their development partners three years ahead (in 2021). In addition, the share of development co-operation recorded on budgets subject to parliamentary scrutiny has fallen, from 66% in 2016 to 61% in 2018, undermining domestic accountability over these resources. These results call for further efforts to provide partner country governments with forward-looking information on development co-operation to enable effective planning and budgeting, as well as to ensure parliamentary oversight over national development efforts.

**While the number of partners reporting to global information systems and standards has increased, progress on timely and forward-looking information on development co-operation remains limited.** Since 2016, the number of development partners reporting to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and to the International Aid Transparency Initiative has increased, signalling broadening uptake of the Busan commitment for transparent and accountable development co-operation information. However, development partners continue to face challenges, as there has not been a substantial increase in providing timely and forward-looking information on development co-operation.

**More inclusive and predictable engagement is required to capitalise on civil society's contribution to development.** Results of the 2018 Monitoring Round show that of all national stakeholders, development partners consult most with civil society organisations (CSOs). However, CSOs report that these consultations are not systematic, which hinders their ability to provide quality input. Furthermore, in most countries (82%), CSOs consider

that development partners' funding to CSOs is primarily driven by development partners' own interests and priorities. Development partners' strengthened engagement with these stakeholders and work with partner country governments to promote an effective enabling environment would help to maximise civil society's contribution to SDG implementation.

**Although the development co-operation landscape is evolving, development partners continue to value mutual accountability structures and processes.** Results of the 2018 Monitoring Round show that development partners perceive mutual accountability assessments as a key component to improve the ways of working at country level, and this signals the need to continue to invest in these mechanisms. However, the modalities of engagement are diversifying and development partners' disbursements to the public sector are decreasing as a relative share of co-operation portfolios. In response to this evolution, the Global Partnership is updating its monitoring to reflect the challenges of the 2030 Agenda. It has developed a tailored approach to monitor effective development co-operation in fragile contexts that will be rolled out in the next Monitoring Round, it is supporting country-led efforts to adapt the monitoring for South-South co-operation, and foresees integrating its forthcoming principles for private sector engagement into its monitoring framework. As such, and guided by the findings of this report, the Global Partnership will carry on adapting its monitoring to uphold mutual accountability and ensure continued relevance and cutting-edge evidence in a changing world.

## 1. Introduction

### Effective partnerships are a cornerstone of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development<sup>1</sup>

**Global development challenges, and threats to hard-won development gains, have not eased since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.** Indeed, they are ever more pressing, complex and inter-related (Biermann, Kanie and Kim, 2017<sup>[1]</sup>). The 2030 Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a roadmap to tackle these challenges through a whole-of-society approach, one that builds on the collective actions of all stakeholders to deliver long-lasting solutions for people and the planet while leaving no one behind. Partnerships are pivotal to attaining all the SDGs. This is clearly set out in SDG 17, which calls for strengthening the means of implementation and revitalising the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015<sup>[2]</sup>).

International efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of development co-operation<sup>2</sup> build on over a decade of lessons, with the aim of ensuring that all available resources are mobilised and used in a way that maximises their potential. Following consecutive processes in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008), the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was endorsed in 2011 by 161 governments as well as heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives of civil society, the private sector, parliamentarians, and other stakeholders committed to strengthening the effectiveness of their joint efforts for development (OECD, 2011<sup>[3]</sup>). The Busan Partnership defined four internationally agreed principles for effective development co-operation (Figure 1.1), and marked a fundamental shift, moving beyond a focus on traditional aid to a recognition of the increasingly important roles of diverse development actors (GPEDC, 2016<sup>[4]</sup>).

### The Global Partnership spurs action for more effective partnerships in order to achieve long-lasting development results

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (hereafter Global Partnership) is a unique multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all actors in delivering results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievement of the SDGs, including the commitment to leave no one behind. The Global Partnership provides practical guidance and shares knowledge to improve

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<sup>1</sup>. The introduction to Part II is the same as in Part I.

<sup>2</sup>. According to Alonso and Glennie (2015<sup>[55]</sup>), development co-operation can be described as an activity that meets the following four criteria: 1) explicit support to national or international development priorities; 2) not driven by profit; 3) discriminates in favour of developing countries; and 4) is based on co-operative relationships that seek to enhance partner country ownership. Due to this shift, and to ongoing changes that have broadened the development landscape in terms of actors and available resources, development co-operation encompasses a broad area of international action that features several financial and non-financial modalities (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2014<sup>[57]</sup>). Development co-operation modalities can include financial transfers; capacity building; technology development; and transfer on voluntary and mutually agreed terms, policy change (for example, to ensure coherence of domestic policies and help to address global systemic issues) and multi-stakeholder partnerships (Zimmerman and Smith, 2011<sup>[56]</sup>).

development impact, and it supports country-level implementation of the internationally agreed effectiveness principles (Figure 1.1).

**The Global Partnership was established by the Busan Partnership agreement and conducts global monitoring to track progress against the commitments and actions agreed in Busan.** The Global Partnership's flagship instrument is its biennial monitoring exercise, which since 2013 has tracked progress towards the effectiveness principles, and is the recognised source of data and evidence on upholding effectiveness commitments.<sup>3</sup> Data generated from the Global Partnership monitoring provide evidence for SDG follow-up and review. The Global Partnership is the sole contributor for data on three SDG targets: 1) respect each country's policy space and leadership (SDG 17.15); 2) multi-stakeholder partnerships for development (SDG 17.16); and 3) adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment (SDG 5.c).<sup>4</sup>

The Global Partnership monitoring exercise has two fundamental objectives. The first is to assess how effectively governments have established a conducive environment to lead national development efforts, enable the full participation of the whole of society and maximise the impact of joint efforts. The second is to assess how development partners deliver their support in a way that is focused on country-owned development priorities and that draws on existing country systems and capacities to reduce burden and ensure sustainability of results. The 2019 Progress Report addresses these two objectives in turn. Part I of the Progress Report looks at the first of the two objectives, focusing on country ownership and examining how partner countries are putting in place the building blocks for an effective, whole-of-society development effort. Part II focuses on how effectively development partners support such country-led efforts.

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<sup>3</sup>. Annex A presents a full list of the Global Partnership indicators and where to find them in the 2019 Progress Report.

<sup>4</sup>. Global Partnership data also inform the annual UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF); the UN Economic and Social Council Forum on Financing for Development; and the SDG reviews of partner countries, including voluntary national reviews that are presented at the HLPF.

**Figure 1.1. Principles for effective development co-operation**



Note: CSOs: civil society organisations; MDBs: multilateral development banks.

Source: GPEDC (2017<sup>[5]</sup>), Effective co-operation principles website, <http://effectivecooperation.org/about/principles>.

## The 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round: The methodology

**The Global Partnership monitoring exercise differs from other global accountability frameworks in that its focus is on the quality of partnering that takes place to deliver development results and outcomes, rather than on the results themselves.** Recognising the unique roles and responsibilities of each actor, the Global Partnership monitoring exercise is country-led and voluntary and aims to strengthen multi-stakeholder dialogue at country, regional and global level. The exercise drives change in the way development co-operation is provided by collecting country-generated data that highlight where progress is being made and where challenges persist, and thus brings together stakeholders around concrete findings to chart a new path forward.

The Global Partnership monitoring exercise is country-led. Partner country governments, on a voluntary basis, opt to conduct the monitoring exercise in their country.<sup>5</sup> Each participating partner country assigns a government focal point to lead the monitoring exercise in country. While it is led by the government, the exercise aims to strengthen multi-stakeholder dialogue. The *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators* (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[6]</sup>) recommends that the government focal points that are leading the exercise collaborate with representatives from bilateral and multilateral development agencies, civil

<sup>5</sup>. The Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership launched the monitoring exercise by issuing an invitation letter at ministerial level to partner countries to participate in the 2018 Monitoring Round.



society, the private sector, parliamentarians, and other relevant actors in order to collect data for the exercise with the support and guidance of the Joint Support Team of the OECD and the UNDP.

Multi-stakeholder validation of country-generated data is an important part of the monitoring process, ensuring high-quality reporting and strengthening mutual understanding of progress and challenges in meeting effectiveness commitments. As a consequence, government focal points are encouraged to invite representatives from across stakeholder groups to come together during the validation phase. By embedding the process in national mechanisms and providing strong government capacity, leadership and adequate resources, more than half of the partner countries that participated (46 of 86) conducted the monitoring exercise as a comprehensive multi-stakeholder process at country level. Others (40 of 86), while eager to participate, carry out the exercise as a multi-stakeholder process to varying degrees, depending on country context and context-specific challenges.

The process of carrying out the monitoring exercise has several benefits. For partner country governments, the exercise builds national capacity to monitor effectiveness in country. It also serves as an entry point to mobilise and engage with a broad range of stakeholders on the quality of ongoing co-operation, strengthening relationships and building trust. For development partners, the exercise provides a platform to identify where progress is needed in order to work more effectively with partner countries and encourages the development of joint solutions to shared challenges. For domestic development actors, the monitoring exercise provides a unique multi-stakeholder process to engage in dialogue with government and international partners and to identify solutions for more effective development partnerships.

The Global Partnership reports on progress through ten indicators that capture the essence of the four principles for effective development co-operation. Some of these indicators have their roots in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005<sup>[7]</sup>); others were introduced in 2012 to capture the broader dimensions of the Busan Partnership agreement, as called for by developing countries. In 2017, a comprehensive review of the indicators was conducted in line with the renewed mandate of the Global Partnership to better reflect the opportunities of the 2030 Agenda.<sup>6</sup> Throughout this report, associated methodologies of the ten indicators are described in broad terms where necessary (often in a box) for clarification of the text. A comprehensive account of the methodology of Global Partnership monitoring is contained in the [2018 Monitoring Guide for National Coordinators](#) (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[6]</sup>), the [Technical Companion Document](#) (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[8]</sup>), the [2018 Monitoring Round: Mini Guide for Development Partners](#) (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[9]</sup>) and the [Indicative Terms of Reference for Development Partners](#) (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[10]</sup>).


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<sup>6</sup> The review was guided by technical advice from a monitoring advisory group, lessons learnt from the 2016 Global Partnership Monitoring Round and online consultations. More information is available on the Global Partnership website at: <http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/global-partnership-monitoring-2-0/track-2-adapting-monitoring-to-new-challenges>.

## The 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round: Key facts

The data gathered during the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round constitute the evidence base for the Progress Report (see Box 1.1).<sup>7</sup> This Monitoring Round, the third biennial monitoring round, was launched in June 2018.<sup>8</sup> Data collection and validation continued until March 2019. A record 86 partner countries and territories participated. Most of the participating countries are **low and middle-income countries**; more than half are **fragile contexts**; and 22 are **small island developing states**. Almost all **least developed countries** (43, or 91% of the total) participated in the Monitoring Round (Figure 1.2).

**Figure 1.2. Partner countries that participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round**




*Note:* All of the high-income countries that participated are small island developing states.

*Sources:* Income classification: World Bank (2018<sup>[11]</sup>), “Classifying countries by income”, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/stories/the-classification-of-countries-by-income.html>; fragility classification: OECD (2018<sup>[12]</sup>), *States of Fragility 2018*, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264302075-en>.

The 86 participating partner countries that led country-level data collection on the effectiveness of their development co-operation did so in collaboration with more than 100 **development partners** (Figure 1.3) and hundreds of **civil society organisations, private sector representatives, foundations, trade unions, parliamentarians and local governments**.

<sup>7</sup>. Annex A provides further detail on the indicators and coverage of the monitoring exercise.

<sup>8</sup>. The launch of the 2018 Monitoring Round was timed to align to partner country annual fiscal cycles, many of which end in December, and to allow for the completion of a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder review to strengthen the monitoring framework.

**Figure 1.3. Types of development partners that participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round**

*Notes:* “DAC members” include 29 bilateral member countries and the European Union. “Other bilateral” includes all bilateral partners that are not part of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). “Other international organisations” are those that are not multilateral development banks, United Nations (UN) agencies or vertical funds/initiatives.

This Progress Report covers:

- More than 3 300 projects and programmes (USD 64.7 billion<sup>9</sup>). Individual projects and programmes reported are the basis for assessing the extent to which development partners use country-owned results frameworks, monitoring and statistics systems.
- Development co-operation funding in the amount of USD 58.8 billion disbursed as grants and loans by development partners, including USD 37.8 billion disbursed directly to the public sector in the 86 participating countries.<sup>10</sup> Disbursements made to the public sector are the basis for assessing the predictability of development co-operation and the use of country systems. To avoid double counting in a situation in which one development partner disburses funds on behalf of another, reporting covers only the development partner that made the final disbursement at country

<sup>9</sup>. This amount refers to the total budget for those projects and programmes that were newly approved during 2017 and which may also span across several years. Therefore, disbursements could be phased during subsequent years.

<sup>10</sup>. The data covered by the 2018 Monitoring Round represent at least three-fourths of the equivalent of country programmable aid (CPA) for 59 countries (68%) and at least half of the equivalent of CPA for 70 countries (82%). The data cover less than 25% of the equivalent of CPA for only 5 (6%) of the countries. CPA is used as a reference point because it provides an approximation of the overall resources transferred by development partners to partner countries. CPA is a subset of the total gross bilateral ODA that is subject to multi-year planning at country/regional level. More details on CPA can be found at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/country-programmable-aid-cpa.htm>.

level. This approach does not aim to quantify overall support provided by development partners, but rather to assess the quality of support provided.

### Box 1.1. How to read this report

All findings and conclusions presented in this report draw on data from the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round unless otherwise stated or referenced. Where a comparison is drawn with 2016, this refers to data from the 2016 Global Partnership Monitoring Round. For comparisons with 2011, data from Paris Declaration monitoring (OECD, 2005<sup>[7]</sup>) are used.

For clarity on language used throughout this Progress Report and for ease of reference:

- **“Partner country or territory”** is used to refer to developing countries and territories that reported to the Global Partnership Monitoring Round in 2018.<sup>1</sup>
- **“Development partner”** is used to refer to official agencies, including state and local governments, or to their executive agencies that provide development co-operation. This includes DAC and non-DAC bilateral partners, as well as multilateral development partners including for example multilateral development banks and vertical funds.
- **“Development actors”** is used to refer to the full range of development stakeholders. This includes, for example, civil society and development partners as defined above as well as non-traditional development partners (e.g. the private sector and foundations).

All percentages that refer to partner countries are to be interpreted as proportions of the overall 2018 monitoring sample of 86 participating partner countries unless otherwise specified. Some percentages describe a subset of the 86 partner countries.

1. Participation in this process and mention of any participant in this document are without prejudice to the status or international recognition of a given country or territory.

## 2. Walking the talk: development partners are not fully facilitating country leadership over development efforts

**The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development emphasises the critical role of international public finance to complement domestic resources, particularly in the poorest and most vulnerable countries** (UN, 2015<sup>[2]</sup>). According to preliminary data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) (OECD, 2019<sup>[13]</sup>), official development assistance (ODA)<sup>11</sup> by DAC member countries amounted to USD 149.3 billion in 2018, a drop of 2.7% in real terms over 2017. Furthermore, a declining share went to the neediest countries, with a 2.7% fall for least developed countries (LDCs)<sup>12</sup> and in particular, a 4.4% fall for sub-Saharan countries. Excluding funds spent on hosting refugees, ODA remained constant between 2017 and 2018. As highlighted in the *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development* (OECD, 2018<sup>[14]</sup>), this stagnation in ODA is accompanied by a decline in private development flows and a 12% decline in overall external finance to developing countries between 2013 and 2016.<sup>13</sup> In this context, it is more important than ever to increase the effectiveness of development co-operation so that all resources are channelled and delivered in the most effective way to leave no one behind and realise the ambition of the 2030 Agenda.

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which sets out the means of implementing the 2030 Agenda, recognises the need “to improve the quality, impact and effectiveness of development co-operation and other international efforts in public finance, including adherence to agreed development co-operation effectiveness principles” (UN, 2015<sup>[15]</sup>).

This chapter focuses on four aspects of development partner support: 1) alignment of development partners’ strategies and projects to country-led development priorities and results; 2) forward visibility of development co-operation, including its annual and medium-term predictability and its recording on partner countries’ budgets; 3) use of partner country public financial management systems; and 4) progress made in untying aid.

The key findings of this chapter are:

- Alignment of development partner projects to partner country objectives, results indicators, statistics and monitoring systems is declining. Where development partners’ country strategies are closely aligned to country-owned results frameworks, partners’ projects also tend to be closely aligned. While some development partners have increased alignment of project objectives to partner country plans and strategies, such alignment is declining among many other

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<sup>11</sup>. Official development assistance flows are defined by the OECD as those flows that go to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions; they are provided by official agencies and administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective; and they are concessional in character. More detail on the definition is available in OECD (2019<sup>[66]</sup>).

<sup>12</sup>. As of December 2018, 47 countries are included in the UN Committee for Development Policy list of least developed countries. The list is available at: [https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc\\_list.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf).

<sup>13</sup>. The 2018 report, *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development*, found that foreign direct investment to developing countries plunged by around one-third over 2016 and 2017.

development partners. Moreover, development partners are decreasingly drawing on country-defined results and using national statistics and monitoring systems. This signals a decline in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 17.15 which calls for “respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development” (UN, 2015<sup>[2]</sup>). This is particularly the case for bilateral partners. Increasing the use of country-owned results frameworks (CRFs), along with efforts to use and strengthen national statistics and monitoring systems, would help ensure that development co-operation not only addresses partner countries’ priorities, but also contributes to their capacity to plan, monitor and evaluate their progress towards sustainable development.

- Despite improvement in annual predictability, challenges remain on forward visibility of development partners’ activities. While the share of development co-operation disbursed within the same year as was planned has marginally increased, the data also indicate a significant amount of unplanned disbursements. This mismatch between planned and actual disbursements can impact development partners’ project implementation, and can hinder partner countries’ effective planning, budgeting and execution. Furthermore, data show a decrease in the availability of forward expenditure and implementation plans to partner countries and a decrease in the share of development co-operation recorded on partner countries’ national budgets.
- Development partners’ use of country systems is greater where they have long-term partnerships with partner country governments and channel a greater share of funds to the public sector. On average, the use of country systems when channelling development co-operation to the public sector has increased since 2016. Data show that this increase is closely linked to whether development partners have a long-term presence in a country and disburse a greater share of funds to the public sector. In these situations, development partners also perform better on medium-term predictability. These findings reconfirm the importance of building strong, long-term partnerships; while resource- and time-intensive, such partnerships also lay the foundation for upholding the internationally agreed effectiveness principles.
- Concrete steps are required to go beyond formally untying aid to better untie in practice. DAC members have made progress in increasing the share of untied aid but ODA-funded contracts are still awarded largely to suppliers based in DAC countries. The obstacles that prevent suppliers in the partner country from securing aid contracts should be addressed to achieve real progress in untying ODA in practice.

### Where development partners are aligned at the level of country strategy, they also tend to be aligned at project level

**Development partner alignment to country-led development priorities is at the heart of country ownership.** With their endorsement of the Busan Partnership agreement, development partners committed to rely on CRFs<sup>14</sup> to guide their support to partner

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<sup>14</sup>. Global Partnership monitoring uses a broad definition of CRFs to account for the possibility that some countries may not articulate their priorities through a single, integrated CRF. This broad definition includes CRFs in national or subnational strategies, sector plans, ministerial or

countries and, to the extent possible, avoid parallel systems of monitoring and tracking results of their development interventions (OECD, 2011<sub>[16]</sub>). In the Nairobi Outcome Document (GPEDC, 2016<sub>[17]</sub>), use of country-owned results frameworks was reaffirmed as a matter of urgency for development partners (GPEDC, 2016<sub>[17]</sub>). Furthermore, development partners also committed to support the strengthening of partner countries' statistical capacity and monitoring and evaluation systems, with the aim of enhancing data collection and analysis.

**Partner country governments are typically engaged in the design of the development partner's country strategy, but less engaged in monitoring and evaluating these strategies.** In addition to aligning their individual projects,<sup>15</sup> development partners align to national priorities by way of their country strategies, which provide overarching and strategic guidance for the development partner's support to a partner country (Box 2.1 and Figure 2.1). The 2030 Agenda is also increasingly used as a shared framework for results (Box 2.2). Development partners reported that 831 country strategies were in place in 2018. Partner country governments were involved in the preparation of 94% of the strategies (Figure 2.1). For almost three-fourths of the strategies, the partner country government signed off on the final document (73%) and/or the strategy includes results indicators that are drawn from CRFs, plans and strategies (72%).<sup>16</sup> However, fewer (65%) use government data and statistics to report on the strategy's results indicators. Moreover, 24% of the strategies that plan an evaluation do not include the partner country government in either the evaluation of the country strategy or a discussion of the evaluation process and results. In a small proportion of country strategies (6%), partner country governments were not engaged in the preparation of the strategy. About one-fourth (26%) of these cases are in extremely fragile contexts;<sup>17</sup> examples of the other countries and contexts where some development partners' country strategies were prepared without consulting the government include Kenya and Viet Nam. Disaggregating this result by development partner type, 11% of DAC member strategies did not include the partner country government in the preparation of the strategy. In contrast, the strategies of United Nations (UN) agencies and multilateral development banks very rarely (1%) did not engage the partner country government.

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
institutional plans, and joint government-development partner strategies. The full CRF definition is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 50-51<sub>[6]</sub>).

<sup>15</sup> For purpose of readability, "programme and projects" are hereafter referred to as projects across this report.

<sup>16</sup> Of the strategies that do not include results indicators drawn from CRFs, plans and strategies (28% of all strategies), 63% are in partner countries where there is a single, integrated CRF that is part of the national development strategy. The remaining 37% of strategies are in ten partner countries where there is no integrated country-owned results framework within the national development strategy. However, this does not exclude that sector strategies or other national planning documents could contain results frameworks to which partners could align.

<sup>17</sup> The 2018 OECD fragility framework classifies 58 contexts as fragile across a spectrum of intensity and in economic, environmental, political, security and societal dimensions. Of these 58, 45 are partner countries that participated in the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round. The OECD further classifies 15 of the 58 fragile contexts as extremely fragile; 12 of these 15 are partner countries that participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round. The OECD (2018<sub>[12]</sub>) report, *States of Fragility*, presents the fragility framework.

**Figure 2.1. Development partners' country strategies strongly align to national priorities, but less so to country-owned results frameworks**



*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of development partners' use of country-owned results frameworks (Indicator 1a, strategy level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Co\\_ordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Co_ordinator.pdf).

### Box 2.1. How development partner alignment is assessed

In assessing development partner alignment to country-led development priorities, Global Partnership monitoring looks at two levels of possible alignment:


1. Alignment of **country strategies** and characteristics of development partners' country strategies. This includes assessing whether: priority areas of the country strategy were jointly identified with the government; results indicators were drawn from country-owned results frameworks (CRFs); the partner country government is involved in monitoring and evaluation of the country strategy; and the strategy references the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
2. Alignment of **individual projects**, including specific development partner interventions such as programmes and projects (referred to as projects in this report). This includes assessing whether: project objectives are drawn from country development plans and strategies; project targets, results and indicators are drawn from the CRFs; government data and statistics are used to monitor project results; and the government is involved in the project evaluation. The average of the first three elements in project-level assessment provides the official data to report on the extent to which the development partner respects the partner country's policy space and leadership in setting its own development path (SDG Target 17.15).

In the 2018 Global Monitoring Round, assessment of alignment of country strategies is based on the 831 country strategies that development partners reported were in place in 2018 across the 86 participating partner countries.



Assessment of alignment of individual projects is based on more than 3 300 projects. Development partners reported on their six largest (in monetary value) projects from all their new interventions in each partner country of USD 100 000 or more, approved in 2017. Focusing on the six largest projects captures an illustrative sample of development partners' current practices. The minimal qualifying amount of USD 100 000 is the total budget for the project as approved during 2017 (i.e. commitments), even if disbursement may be phased during subsequent years.

**Figure 2.2. Alignment to national development priorities in country strategies and individual projects**



**Where development partner country strategies are closely aligned to CRFs, projects also tend to be closely aligned.** This correspondence of alignment in projects where there is close alignment in strategies extends across all elements, according to data from the 2018 Monitoring Round<sup>18</sup>. For example, where development partners use the data and statistical systems of a partner country government or involve partner country governments in

<sup>18</sup>. The relationship between alignment of country strategies and alignment of individual projects was tested on the four assessed elements of alignment and found to be statistically significant for each element. The data draw on development partner-partner country pairs for which information is available on alignment at the level of both country strategy and project and where the country strategy started in 2017 or earlier.


evaluations at the strategic level, they also tend to do so at the project level. Further analysis of the 2018 data shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between the quality of partner country national development strategies and development partners' use of these strategies to align to country priorities and results. This finding, together with the results regarding the use of CRFs, suggests that decisions on closer alignment to partner country priorities hinge on factors that are specific to the development partner.

### Box 2.2. The 2030 Agenda is increasingly being operationalised as a global results framework

Development partners increasingly reference the 2030 Agenda in their country strategies, demonstrating the utility of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a framework for results around shared objectives. As discussed in Part I of this report, 90% of partner countries with national development strategies adopted in or since 2015 reference the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. For development partners, the 2030 Agenda and/or SDGs typically are referenced in the narrative of the development partner's country strategy or partnership framework (65% of 563 country strategies that started in or since 2015). Fewer refer to the SDGs at target level (37%) or indicator level (36%), although these shares are trending upward. Disaggregated by year of approval of the strategy, the data show that the proportion of country strategies referring to the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs at all levels increased between 2015 and 2018 (Figure 2.3). Of the most recent strategies (starting in 2018), 74% include reference to the SDGs to define priority areas or sectors and 59% apply SDG indicators in their results frameworks.

Figure 2.3. Development partners increasingly reference the 2030 Agenda in their country strategies

Proportion of country strategies that reference the 2030 Agenda and/or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), by year and level of SDG reference



Source: Figure draws on assessment of development partners' use of country-owned results frameworks (Indicator 1a). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

UN funds, programmes and agencies are taking the lead in using the 2030 Agenda as a global results framework. The 2030 Agenda and/or the SDGs are referenced in the narrative of their country strategy or partnership framework in 79% of strategies approved in 2015 or later (compared to 65% on average for all development partners). The United Nations' strong performance in this area is further demonstrated at the indicator and target levels. Strategies of UN funds, programmes and agencies refer to the SDGs at indicator level 56% of the time (compared to 36% on average) and at target level 59% of the time (compared to 37% on average).

Alignment of the UN development system's operational activities to country priorities continues to be strengthened, guided by the 2012 and 2016 quadrennial comprehensive policy reviews and bolstered by renewed commitment to drawing on the SDGs as a common results framework. Reforms called for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 72/279 aim to further this effort.

One of these reform measures is the revitalisation of the UN Development Assistance Framework, now named the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF). The UNSDCF is the most important instrument for planning and implementing UN development activities at the country level. The UN guidance on establishing the UNSDCFs recommends using the SDGs as a common results framework that can be informed by country-defined and disaggregated baselines.

*Sources:* (UN, 2016<sup>[18]</sup>) Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, <https://undocs.org/A/RES/71/2431>; (UN, 2012<sup>[19]</sup>) Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system, [https://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/226](https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/226); (UN, 2018<sup>[20]</sup>) *Repositioning of the United Nations development system in the context of the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system*, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/279](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/72/279); (UN, 2019<sup>[21]</sup>) *United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework: Internal Guidance*, <https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/UN-Cooperation-Framework-Internal-Guidance-Final-June-2019.pdf>.


## Alignment to partner country objectives, results indicators, statistics and monitoring systems is declining

**On aggregate, individual project objectives remain fairly aligned with national development priorities, but this is declining for most development partners.** Assessment of more than 3 300 projects in the 2018 Monitoring Round found that 83% of project objectives are aligned to country-led priorities. This is slightly lower than in the 2016 Monitoring Round (85%). Vertical funds (e.g. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance) and other international organisations (e.g. the International Organization for Migration) increasingly draw most project objectives from national plans and strategies. In contrast, alignment of project objectives to national priorities is decreasing among UN agencies, multilateral development banks and bilateral development partners (DAC and non-DAC members)<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup>. When disaggregated by development partner, some types of partners have increased alignment of project objectives. However, for the vast majority of projects on average across all development

(Figure 2.4). The World Health Organisation, however, is a good practice example of project-level alignment (Box 2.4). Overall, development partners prefer to align to national development strategies and sector plans over other development planning instruments (Figure 2.5).


**Figure 2.4. Alignment of project objectives has decreased for most development partners**



*Notes:* Figure draws on a sample of new projects approved in 2017 in the 86 participating partner countries of the 2018 Monitoring Round. It is organised by type of development partner. The number under the description of each group (left column) is the total number of such projects reported by development partners in each group. *Source:* Figure draws on assessment of alignment of development partners' projects to partner countries' objectives, results, and statistical and monitoring systems (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp.46-52<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

partners, alignment at the level of the projects' objectives decreased since the 2016 round, driving down the global average.

**Figure 2.5. National development strategies are the planning instruments most used by development partners to align to government objectives**




*Notes:* Ministerial or institutional plans are development plans specific to a ministry or other government entities. Examples of other planning tools reported by development partners include disaster recovery and reconstruction frameworks and private sector development plans. Examples of joint government-development partner strategies include poverty reduction strategies and country partnership strategies.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of alignment of development partners' projects to partner countries' objectives, results, and statistical and monitoring systems (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Development partners' reliance on government-defined results, statistics and monitoring systems has declined since 2016.** While alignment at the level of project objectives is fair, only 59% of results indicators outlined in individual projects are drawn from CRFs. Box 2.3 provides details on different elements of project-level alignment). Furthermore, only 50% of all results indicators are monitored using national statistics and monitoring systems. The decline since the 2016 Monitoring Round is significant for most development partners (Figure 2.6). Multilateral development banks are an exception in this regard, as their use of CRFs and national statistics and monitoring systems increased since 2016. The share of results indicators monitored using national statistics and monitoring systems also increased among UN agencies. In their responses to the 2018 Monitoring Round, development partners cited data gaps and lack of disaggregated information as reasons CRFs are frequently not used. Findings discussed in Part I of this report confirm that such gaps exist. Only 35% of partner country governments (25 of 72) reported that timely, regular and accurate government data are available for all or most indicators in their results framework. This reconfirms the need for further efforts by development partners to help strengthen and increase the use of national statistics and monitoring systems, in accordance with commitments made in Busan and Nairobi. Box 2.4 in Part I and Box 2.5 in this chapter further illustrate the need for strengthening and using national statistical systems. Overall, the decline in alignment of project objectives, use of CRFs, and national statistics and monitoring systems signals a decline in SDG 17.15 (Box 2.3).

**Figure 2.6. Development partners' reliance on country-defined results, statistics and monitoring systems is decreasing**



*Notes:* Figure draws on a sample of new projects approved in 2017 in participating countries. It is organised by type of development partner.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of alignment of development partners' projects to partner countries' objectives, results, and statistical and monitoring systems (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp.46-52<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Box 2.3. The Global Partnership monitoring exercise is the sole source of data to measure SDG Target 17.15 on “respect for each country’s policy space and leadership”<sup>1</sup>**

Building on the Paris Declaration, which emphasised that development partners must align to national priorities to achieve long-lasting results (OECD, 2005<sup>(7)</sup>), the 2030 Agenda recognises that “each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development”. Furthermore, endorsement of the 2030 Agenda constituted a global commitment to “respect each country’s policy space and leadership to implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development, while remaining consistent with relevant international rules and commitments”, as is stated in Paragraph 63 (UN, 2015<sup>(2)</sup>). While there is no agreed definition, respect for policy space and leadership can be understood as allowing a country to determine its own path to sustainable development, including by defining its development priorities and results. Alignment at the level of individual projects is critical to reinforcing and respecting country policy space and leadership in a practical and operational manner. In this regard, the Global Partnership assessment of development partners’ use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools (see Box 2.1) is recognised by the UN Statistical Commission as a measure of progress towards SDG Target 17.15 on respect for partner countries’ policy space and


leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development<sup>2</sup> (UN, 2016<sub>[22]</sub>).

The extent to which CRFs and planning tools are used in the design and monitoring of new development projects dropped from 64% in the 2016 monitoring round to 62% in the 2018 round (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). This signals a decline in SDG target 17.15 which calls for “respect for partner countries’ policy space and leadership to establish and implement their own poverty eradication and sustainable development policies” (UN, 2015<sub>[2]</sub>). For bilateral partners, the decline corresponds to decreased alignment of project objectives to country-led priorities and decreased reliance on country-defined results, statistics and monitoring systems. For multilateral partners, the decline is due to a decrease in the reliance on country-defined results, statistics and monitoring systems. As was the case in the 2016 Monitoring Round, use of CRFs and planning tools remains higher on average among multilaterals than with bilateral partners. Within the multilateral partner group, multilateral development banks (72%) drive the average up, while UN agencies (56%) lag behind. The decline is of 7-percentage points more pronounced for bilateral development partners, from 64% in 2016 to 57% in 2018.


**Figure 2.7. Decreasing use of country-owned results frameworks indicates declining respect for country policy space and leadership, especially for bilateral partners**

SDG 17.15.1: “Extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development co-operation”

A. By type of development partner



## B. By indicator component



*Notes:* 1. SDG Indicator 17.15.1 (“extent of use of country-owned results frameworks and planning tools by providers of development co-operation”) is the only indicator to measure SDG Target 17.15 (“respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development”). 2. The indicator is the average of alignment at three levels: objectives, results, and monitoring and statistics. For the 2018 monitoring exercise, this was calculated for the 70 development partners in 80 partner countries for which data are available at all three levels; in 2016, calculations were for 73 development partners in 81 partner countries. This reduced sample did not allow for comprehensive representation of all types of development partners. Therefore, for this specific indicator, figures are presented aggregated by the two broader types of development partners: bilateral and multilateral. 3. In the context of the SDG follow-up and review, the Global Partnership provides data on SDG Indicator 17.15.1 only for bilateral development partners. For the purpose of the Global Partnership monitoring exercise, the methodology for SDG Indicator 17.15.1 is extended to multilateral development partners.


*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of development partners’ use of country-owned results frameworks (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>[23]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Partner country government involvement in project evaluations has increased slightly, but is not consistent across development partners.** Project evaluations not only improve the design and implementation of future projects, but also promote dialogue and co-operation among development actors. Involving partner country governments in evaluations is critical to strengthen country ownership, reinforce accountability and build trust. Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round show that a final evaluation was planned in 70% of all projects, a drop from the 77% reported in the 2016 monitoring exercise. However, a slightly larger share of the projects that plan a final evaluation – 59% in the 2018 round versus 57% in the 2016 round – envisage some degree of government involvement. Half of these projects (50%) that plan a final evaluation anticipated the government would be involved in defining the evaluation scope, 2% planned for the government to contribute to financing the evaluation and 12% planned government



involvement in both. The data show that government involvement in project evaluations expands as the size of the project increases. Notwithstanding the size of their project, non-DAC bilateral partners, UN agencies and vertical funds are more likely than other development partners to involve partner country governments in project evaluations.

**Figure 2.8. Government involvement in evaluations has slightly increased, but remains mixed across development partners**



*Notes:* Figure draws on a sample of new projects approved in 2017 in participating countries. Percentages for the different groups of development partners refer to all projects reported that plan a final evaluation. Government involvement in final evaluations is calculated for those projects that plan a final evaluation. The government is involved in the final evaluation when it defines the evaluation scope jointly with the development partner and/or contributes to finance the evaluation.


*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of alignment of development partners' projects to partner countries' objectives, results, and statistical and monitoring systems (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

#### **Box 2.4. The World Health Organization ensures strong project-level alignment**

The World Health Organization (WHO) performs well above the overall development partner average across all assessed areas pertaining to project-level alignment (Figure 2.8). This could be driven by the agency's strong emphasis on aligning its country-level interventions to national development strategies and country results frameworks.

As a technical agency providing support to its member states, WHO works closely with relevant partners to effectively respond to country priorities and needs in achieving SDG 3 (ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages).

**Figure 2.9. The World Health Organization outperforms on project-level alignment**



*Notes:* Figure draws on a sample of new projects approved in 2017 in participating countries (Indicator 1a, project level). Percentages for the different categories refer to all projects reported by the aggregate of all development partners (light blue bars) and all projects reported by WHO (dark blue bars).

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of alignment of development partners' projects to partner countries' objectives, results, and statistical and monitoring systems (Indicator 1a, project level). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>[23]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

The Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS) outlines the alignment of WHO's support to national health plans and strategies. The CCS is WHO's medium-term strategy, guiding agency planning, budgeting and resource allocation to achieve the health-related Sustainable Development Goals in each country where WHO works.

An integral part of the CCS is the use of monitoring and evaluation as a tool to assess WHO's performance at country level. As noted in the 2019 country presence report, WHO enhances implementation, monitoring and reporting on its technical co-operation through joint WHO and government mechanisms (WHO, 2019<sup>[24]</sup>). The number of country offices reporting they have such mechanisms in place has risen steadily, from 77% to 89% between the 2015 and 2019 country presence reports.

**Box 2.5. Building statistical capacity: Strengthening national statistical systems through their use**

**The need to use and strengthen national statistical systems is a shared and interlinked challenge for partner countries and their development partners.** As discussed in Part I of this Progress Report, two-thirds of partner countries reported that they lack national statistical capacity to track implementation of the national development strategy. The 2018 data show that only half of the results indicators included in development partners' individual projects are tracked using national monitoring and statistical systems and that development partners cited data gaps as one reason country results frameworks are frequently not used. These findings point to an impediment that requires concerted efforts from both partner countries and development partners to address these underpinning challenges. Alongside partner country efforts to strengthen statistical capacity and national monitoring and evaluation systems, development partners can play an important role in strengthening statistical systems by using them. International development partners are often viewed as important and frequent users of national data, and can create positive incentives for national statistical offices to increase and strengthen official statistics in line with both domestic and international demand (Sethi and Prakash, 2018<sub>[25]</sub>).

**Despite a slight increase in the share of total official development assistance (ODA) for data and statistics since 2015, further investments are required to meet the demand for more and better quality data.** The overall amount of ODA for data and statistics remained low in 2016 (USD 623 million), representing only 0.33% of total ODA (PARIS21, 2018<sub>[26]</sub>). In 2018, only 56 of the 102 countries with national statistical plans had secured adequate financing to implement them; only 3 of these are in sub-Saharan Africa (PARIS21, 2018<sub>[26]</sub>). Tracking implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), however, requires an unprecedented amount of data and statistics, from both official statistical systems and new sources (UN, 2018<sub>[27]</sub>).

**A handful of development partners provide a large share of global support for better data.** The World Bank, United Nations Population Fund, Eurostat, International Monetary Fund and United Nations Children's Fund supplied 69% of total commitments in 2016 (PARIS21, 2018<sub>[26]</sub>). Foundations also are recognising the critical role of data in eradicating poverty and are delivering on the commitment to leave no one behind. Between 2013 and 2015, foundations provided 2.4% of their three-year total philanthropic support for development to projects with a strong data and statistics component. However, their support tends to be concentrated in specific sectors, overlooking the wider structural needs of national statistical systems (PARIS21, 2018<sub>[26]</sub>).

**Different international partnerships and initiatives are blossoming to bridge the data divide for sustainable development.** In the same spirit, the Development Assistance Committee agreed in 2018 to support a new workstream on Data for Development that will respond to the six data actions called for in the *Development Co-operation Report 2017: Data for Development* (OECD, 2017<sub>[28]</sub>). This new workstream will establish a community of practice between development partners of development co-operation and the statistical and data for development communities. Through awareness raising, knowledge sharing and development of good practices, the project will help development partners to make more strategic and higher quality investments in national statistical systems in a way that harnesses the data revolution for sustainable development. Complementary to these efforts, the Bern Network<sup>1</sup> on Financing Data for Development

was convened in early 2019. Assembling a broad range of stakeholders, the Bern Network aims to create more effective and co-ordinated funding mechanisms for statistical systems. Results of the network's efforts will be presented at the World Data Forum 2020 in Bern, Switzerland.

1. The Bern Network on Financing Data for Development is an outcome of the Bern High-Level Dialogue on Funding for Data for the SDGs held on 24 January 2019 in Bern, Switzerland.

## Annual predictability has improved slightly, but aggregates hide important variations


**Predictable development co-operation enables successful implementation of development plans, yet predictability has improved only marginally since 2011.** Global Partnership monitoring assesses annual predictability of development co-operation by looking at the proportion of funding that development partners disburse to partner country governments within the fiscal year during which it was scheduled to be disbursed. Development partners have made continuous commitments to improve predictability,<sup>20</sup> and on average, annual predictability improved (from 83% to 87%) between the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds. However, progress has been marginal over the eight-year period since 2011, when annual predictability was 85%. At aggregate level, all types of development partners have improved predictability since the 2016 round, but progress is mixed among and within groups (Figure 2.10).<sup>21</sup> Country studies have confirmed that unpredictable development co-operation has a negative impact on management of public finances and undermines efforts by partner countries and development partners to achieve development results (Mokoro Ltd, 2011<sup>[29]</sup>). Both shortfalls and over-disbursements in the total amount of funding disbursed to the public sector can have serious implications for development partners' implementation of projects on the ground and, overall, on the government's ability to implement its development efforts as planned; these also can hinder effective planning, budgeting and execution (Celasun and Walliser, 2008<sup>[30]</sup>).

<sup>20</sup>. Commitments to improve predictability of development co-operation that were made in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005<sup>[7]</sup>) have been renewed in the Busan Partnership agreement (OECD, 2011<sup>[16]</sup>), the Nairobi Outcome Document (GPEDC, 2016<sup>[17]</sup>) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN, 2015<sup>[15]</sup>).

<sup>21</sup>. The greater predictability of development co-operation by other international organisations is largely explained by International Organization for Migration improvement (from 75% to 98%) and by the high annual predictability of organisations that reported at country level for the first time in the 2018 Monitoring Round. Aggregate figures for UN agencies and other international organisations for the 2016 Monitoring Round have been adjusted to reflect changes in the way they were classified.

**Figure 2.10. On aggregate, annual predictability improved for all development partners**

Proportion of development co-operation disbursed in the same year for which it was originally planned



*Notes:* Global aggregates are calculated using scheduled disbursements for the public sector expressed in USD as weighting variable. Total scheduled disbursements reported in the 2018 Monitoring Round by each group are shown under the description of each group.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of annual predictability of development co-operation disbursed to the public sector (Indicator 5a). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 53-55<sup>[23]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Predictability of funding varies across countries.** In 31 of the 86 countries that participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round,<sup>22</sup> development partners disbursed a total of USD 2.4 billion less than what they had originally scheduled. Among these were Kosovo\* and Moldova, where development partners disbursed approximately half (55% and 54%, respectively) of the total amounts scheduled. On the other hand, in more than half the countries participating in the 2018 Monitoring Round (52 of 86), development partners disbursed more funding than what they had originally scheduled. In total, USD 5.8 billion was reported as disbursed beyond the amount originally scheduled by development partners. Armenia and Ethiopia are examples of countries where development partners disbursed, in total, about twice the amount originally scheduled. Predictability is particularly important in highly ODA-dependent countries where variations in development flows can severely affect the ability of the government to implement development strategies (Celasun and Walliser, 2008<sup>[30]</sup>). Data disaggregation shows that


<sup>22</sup>. In the 2018 Monitoring Round, information on development co-operation funding scheduled for disbursement to the public sector and disbursements was available for 84 countries.

\* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244/99 and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo's declaration of independence.

the share of development co-operation disbursed within the year for which it was originally scheduled – and thus annual predictability – was lower (83%) in highly ODA-dependent countries<sup>23</sup> than in medium and low ODA-dependent countries (86% and 89%, respectively). Discrepancies also are observed between LDCs and non-LDCs. Despite commitments to increase predictability in fragile contexts (PBSB Dialogue, 2011<sup>[31]</sup>) (PBSB Dialogue, 2016<sup>[32]</sup>), annual predictability is on average lower in extremely fragile contexts (73%) than in non-fragile contexts (89%). On the other hand, the share of funds disbursed beyond the amounts originally scheduled is much higher in extremely fragile contexts. Such over-disbursement is likely due to the unplanned and volatile nature of the crises that are prone to occur in extremely fragile contexts.

**Figure 2.11. Predictability is lower in least developed countries, extremely fragile contexts and highly ODA-dependent countries**

Proportion of development co-operation disbursed within the year for which it was scheduled in different partner country contexts



Notes: LDC: least developed country; ODA: official development assistance.

Source: Figure draws on assessment of annual predictability of development co-operation disbursed to the public sector (Indicator 5a). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 53-55<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

<sup>23</sup>. For each country, ODA dependency is calculated as total ODA over GDP per capita. In the 2018 Monitoring Round, dependency is considered low when the ratio is below 1.5%, medium when the ratio is above 1.5% and below 4%, and high when the ratio is above 4%.

## Forward visibility of development co-operation is decreasing, hindering parliamentary oversight in partner countries as well as national government ability to plan and budget for development efforts

**Medium-term predictability is a requirement of effective development planning.** In addition to assessing annual predictability,<sup>24</sup> Global Partnership monitoring assesses medium-term predictability by measuring the extent to which partner country governments receive indicative forward expenditure or implementation plans (hereafter referred to as forward expenditure plans) regarding development partners' planned activities for one, two and three years ahead. When development partners share forward expenditure plans on development co-operation with partner country governments, this information can be used for effective planning of medium-term policies and programmes and in formulation of national budgets that are subject to parliamentary oversight.

**Forward visibility of development co-operation from development partners is lower than it was in 2014.** Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round show that, on average across three years, partner country governments reported they had received development partners' forward expenditure plans covering two-thirds (67%) of estimated development co-operation funding. As was the case for results of previous monitoring rounds, the availability to partner countries of forward expenditure plans was typically higher for the first year ahead (81%) and decreased for the second and third years ahead (to 65% and 56%, respectively) (Figure 2.12). These findings mean that in 2018, on average, partner country governments had forward visibility and could start mid-term planning on only 56% of development co-operation funding that was expected to be received from their development partners in 2021. Forward visibility is much lower in extremely fragile contexts (61%) than in fragile or non-fragile contexts (68%). The *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus* adopted in early 2019 provides a timely response for improving predictability in fragile contexts, calling for the use of predictable, flexible, multi-year financing wherever possible (OECD, 2019<sub>[33]</sub>). Tracking progress to ensure that this Recommendation translates into action will be important.<sup>25</sup>


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<sup>24</sup>. Annual predictability is the extent to which development partners disbursed scheduled funding to partner country government within the same fiscal year as planned; medium-term predictability refers to whether development partners have shared forward expenditure plans with partner country governments.

<sup>25</sup>. Fostering humanitarian-development-peace coherence is one of six action areas in the Global Partnership's recently endorsed tailored approach to monitoring effective development co-operation in fragile contexts. The tailored approach includes a placeholder for which an indicator to measure humanitarian-development-peace coherence is to be developed based on agreed actions, including monitoring the recently adopted *DAC Recommendation on Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus*.

**Figure 2.12. Forward visibility is declining**

Proportion of development co-operation for which partner countries have received forward expenditure plans for the fiscal years ending 2019/2020/2021



*Note:* For the 2016 Progress Report, the assessment covered 2016-18; for the 2014 Progress Report, the assessment covered 2014-16.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of medium-term predictability of development co-operation (Indicator 5b). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 35-37<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Decreasing availability of forward-looking information is mirrored in partner country budgets, weakening parliamentary oversight of development resources.** Including development co-operation funding in partner country budgets<sup>26</sup> helps to align these resources with partner country priorities, contributes to strengthening domestic budgetary processes and institutions, and strengthens domestic oversight of development resources (CABRI, 2008<sup>[34]</sup>). The proportion of development co-operation recorded on budget and subject to parliamentary oversight has declined since the 2016 Monitoring Round. Between 2011 and 2016, the share of development co-operation recorded on budget increased from 57% to 66%, but then fell to 61% in 2018 (see Figure 2.13) and Part I of this report). Comparison of only countries that reported in both the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds shows the same negative trend. Furthermore, in a number of countries (33), including some extremely fragile contexts,<sup>27</sup> development co-operation recorded on national budgets was greater than what development partners had planned to disburse in

<sup>26</sup>. The term “on budget”, as used in this report and measured by Indicator 6 of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation monitoring framework, refers only to the recording of funding planned by development partners in the parliament-approved budget. It does not indicate whether or not the development partner used the government budget process to disburse the funds.


<sup>27</sup>. See Footnote 17.



those countries. Both underestimated and overestimated development co-operation funding on national budgets weaken the ability of government to account effectively for development co-operation to their domestic stakeholders. Development partners and national governments share responsibility for ensuring that development co-operation is on budget. For partner countries, analysis of the 2018 monitoring data shows that a higher share of development co-operation is recorded on the national budget when an aid information management system is in place.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, it is essential that development partners provide accurate projections in a timely manner to ensure that estimates are meaningfully reflected on national budgets.

**Figure 2.13. Availability of forward expenditure plans and share of development co-operation on budget follow the same trend**

Proportion of development co-operation for which forward expenditure plans are made available to partner countries and proportion of development co-operation recorded on partner country national budgets, aggregate trend, 2011-18



*Note:* Data for the share of development co-operation covered by forward expenditure and implementation plans are available starting from 2014.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of medium-term predictability of development co-operation and development co-operation on budget (Indicators 5b and 6). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 35-37 and 56-57<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).


**Against the overall decline, UN agencies improved their forward visibility since 2016.** While the proportion of development co-operation covered by forward expenditure plans

<sup>28</sup>. Analysis of the 2018 monitoring data shows a positive and statistically significant correlation between the existence of aid information management systems and the share of development co-operation recorded on national budgets.

and recorded on budget decreased overall, it has increased for some development partners<sup>29</sup> (Figure 2.14). Since 2016, for example, UN agencies improved forward visibility of their development co-operation. Their share of development co-operation recorded in partner country budgets also grew, although it remains among the lowest (along with that of other international organisations) relative to all development partners. Despite the decline, multilateral development banks performed better than other multilaterals.

**Figure 2.14. In contrast to most other development partners, UN agencies are both increasing availability of forward expenditure plans and development co-operation on national budgets**

Proportion of development co-operation for which forward expenditure plans are made available to partner countries and proportion of development co-operation recorded on partner country national budgets, trend by type of development partner, 2016-18



*Notes:* Global aggregates for the share of development co-operation covered by forward expenditure plans are weighted by the total funding disbursed at country level expressed in USD (shown below each development partner group). Global aggregates for development co-operation recorded on budget are weighted using the total scheduled disbursements for the government sector expressed in USD. The amounts for each group are indicated in Figure 2.9.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of medium-term predictability of development co-operation and development co-operation on budget (Indicators 5b and 6). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 35-37, 56-57<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Forward expenditure plans are more readily available where a development partner and partner country government have an established relationship.** Data analysis shows that more forward expenditure plans are available to partner countries where development partners have a country strategy (or partnership framework) in place or where a higher

<sup>29</sup> Non-DAC bilateral partners and vertical funds diverged from the overall trends in that the decrease in the share of development co-operation covered by forward expenditure plans did not correspond to a lower share of development co-operation recorded on budget. This can be partially explained by variation among the two groups in reporting on the two indicators and by changes in the composition of the groups between 2016 and 2018.

share of development co-operation is disbursed directly to the public sector.<sup>30</sup> This confirms the findings of the 2016 Progress Report, noting that established partnerships between partner country governments and their development partners increased the extent to which effectiveness principles are upheld in country. These analyses also highlight the importance of investing in long-term partnerships for development. For development partners, establishing a country strategy together with the partner country can be key. For partner countries, the findings confirm the utility of establishing policy frameworks for development co-operation. Such frameworks build trust and strengthen partnerships through defined roles and responsibilities for stakeholders, and also define joint commitments for effective development co-operation (see Part I, Chapter 4, of this report on mutual accountability mechanisms).

**The decreasing share of development co-operation disbursed to the public sector points to the need to ensure comprehensive and timely information sharing with partner countries.** According to 2018 Monitoring Round data, direct disbursements to the public sector made up about two-thirds (65%) of development co-operation ultimately disbursed at country level by development partners, or USD 37.8 billion of the USD 58.8 billion disbursed overall.<sup>31</sup> This is a notable decrease from the share found in the 2016 Monitoring Round (80%), suggesting that a larger share of development co-operation is being disbursed to non-state actors (e.g. civil society organisations, the private sector and others) in participating countries. This shift is reflected in the decreased share overall of forward expenditure plans that are made available to partner country governments and of development co-operation that is recorded on national budgets. It also points more broadly to a need to rethink how development partners can ensure that information sharing on development co-operation with partner country governments is sufficiently comprehensive and timely to support both informed development planning (by governments and as part of the associated parliamentary oversight) and country ownership and sustainability of national development efforts.

### Increased use of procurement systems is largely driving the marginal progress made by development partners in using country public financial management systems

**An essential element of country ownership is the use by development partners of a country's public financial management (PFM) systems.** Use of countries' own systems to deliver development co-operation helps to strengthen these systems as well as promote country ownership. This also ensures sustainability of development results, lowers transaction costs by eliminating the creation and maintenance of parallel structures, and provides an entry point for partners to harmonise their processes (CABRI, 2014<sub>[35]</sub>). In recognition of these benefits and following commitments made in the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Action Agenda (2008), the Busan Partnership agreement

<sup>30</sup>. Data analysis shows a positive correlation between the existence of country strategies and forward expenditure plans. Data analysis additionally indicates that the higher the share of development co-operation disbursed to the public sector, the higher the share of development co-operation for which development partners have made forward plans available to partner country governments.

<sup>31</sup>. While the proportion of development co-operation funding that goes to the public sector declined sharply in all contexts, this decline is even more pronounced – from 77% to 31% over the same period – in extremely fragile contexts. Data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System show a slight increase, from 1.4% in 2015 to 1.5% in 2017, in the proportion of core support to civil society organisations in extremely fragile contexts as a share of total ODA disbursed in these contexts.

(Paragraph 19) affirms that use of country systems should be the default approach for managing co-operation provided to the public sector (OECD, 2011<sub>[16]</sub>). Box 2.6 discusses the use of country systems in more detail.


### Box 2.6. What does it mean to use country systems?

A country's public financial management (PFM) system consists of different regulations, standards and processes that guide how the government uses and keeps tracks of its financial resources. (This is discussed in Box 2.6 in Part I of this report). The question of whether a development partner uses country PFM systems, then, is not black and white; the various system components can be used to varying degrees.

The Global Partnership monitoring exercise assesses the extent to which development partners use mechanisms and procedures related to four PFM system components: 1) budget execution; 2) financial reporting; 3) auditing; and 4) procurement.

In terms of budget execution procedures, the Global Partnership assesses whether development co-operation is on budget, meaning it is included in budgets that are submitted for parliamentary approval, and on treasury, meaning it is disbursed through a country's treasury system.<sup>1</sup> Figure 2.15 illustrates in greater detail what it means to use each of the four system components.

**Figure 2.15. Characteristics of use of country public financial management systems**




1. The Global Partnership monitoring exercise determines the share of on-budget development co-operation (Indicator 6) based on partner country governments' reporting on the amount that is recorded on the national budget in the reporting year. To assess use of national budget execution procedures (Indicator 9b), the exercise takes a broader approach, asking development partners whether: funds are recorded in annual budgets, the use of funds is subject to budget execution procedures without adjustment, funds are deposited and disbursed through the national treasury system, and the opening of separate bank accounts are required.

**Development partner use of country PFM systems has increased slightly overall, with notable gains made in the use of procurement systems.** Globally, use of country PFM systems has increased slightly, from 50% in the 2016 Monitoring Round to 53% in the 2018 round. The 2016 data signalled a need for accelerated efforts to increase the use of country procurement systems; the notable 13 percentage point increase in the use of procurement systems reported in 2018 demonstrates that development partners – and

particularly multilateral development banks (MDBs) – did make that effort.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, use of budget execution procedures increased by only 3 percentage points between the 2016 and 2018 rounds while use of financial reporting and auditing systems fell by 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively (Figure 2.16).

**Figure 2.16. Use of country public financial management systems has grown since 2011**

Development partner use of country public financial management systems as a proportion of disbursements to the public sector by system component




Source: Figure draws on assessment of use of country public financial management systems (Indicator 9b). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 58-61<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Coordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**The MDBs, followed closely by DAC members, lead in using country systems.** DAC members' use of country PFM systems continued to grow, increasing from 47% to 55% from the 2016 to the 2018 Monitoring Rounds (Figure 2.17). Among the countries showing the greatest individual increase in the 2018 data (listed in order of largest volume of disbursements to the public sector) were Japan (from 68% to 74%), EU institutions (from 45% to 52%), Australia (from 33% to 41%), Korea (from 46% to 86%), Canada (from 52% to 75%), Italy (from 51% to 94%) and Norway (from 56% to 81%). Beyond the improvements made by these members, other DAC members maintained their high use of country systems, including Sweden (66%), Denmark (92%), Ireland (63%) (also in order of largest volume). On the other hand, use of country PFM systems by non-DAC bilateral

<sup>32</sup>. The MDBs improved use of country procurement systems overall by 18 percentage points between the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds.

partners declined from 2016 to 2018 and results for UN agencies and vertical funds largely stayed the same during this period.<sup>33</sup>

**Figure 2.17. DAC members lead in increasing use of partner country public financial management systems**



*Note:* Aggregate figures for other international organisations for the 2016 Monitoring Round have been adjusted to reflect changes in the way they were classified.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of use of country public financial management systems (Indicator 9b). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 58-61<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Coordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

### A development partner's relationship with a partner country is a stronger determinant of its use of country PFM systems than the partner country's characteristics

**No clear link is evident between the strength of country PFM systems and their use by development partners.** The political commitments around the strengthening and use of country PFM systems are grounded in mutuality: partner countries have committed to strengthen these systems and development partners have committed to increase the use, and thus further improve the quality, of the systems. However, results show that factors other than system quality nevertheless continue to determine development partners' use of country systems. According to 2018 data, there is no obvious correlation between the

<sup>33</sup>. For non-DAC bilateral partners this decrease may relate to a change in the sample. Eleven non-DAC bilateral development partners are included in both the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds. Nineteen non-DAC development partners were included in the 2016 round and 24 in the 2018 round.

quality of a partner country's PFM systems and the extent to which development partners use them.

**The highest use of country PFM systems occurs in lower middle-income countries.**


The extent to which development partners use the systems of low-income countries is considerably below the global average of 53%, but notably increases for those of lower middle-income countries (Figure 2.18). This increase seems to largely reflect greater reliance on loans to deliver development co-operation. The share of disbursements to the public sector in the form of loans, as opposed to grants, rises from 30% for low-income countries to 74% for lower middle-income countries, and further analysis shows that loans are much more frequently administered using country systems.<sup>34</sup> A small number of Eastern European and Western Asian upper middle-income countries (UMICs) appear to be driving the observed downward trend in use of country systems in countries with gross national income (GNI) per capita above approximately USD 1 800.<sup>35</sup> Use of country systems in small island developing states (SIDS) is in line with this trend. A majority (13 of 20) of the SIDS participating in the 2018 Monitoring Round are either UMICs or high-income countries, and in SIDS, country PFM systems are used for only 28% of funds disbursed to the public sector. This could be related to capacity challenges faced by some SIDS (see Box 2.7 in Part I of this report) in setting up and operating PFM systems that can manage financial flows from various development partners.<sup>36</sup> In extremely fragile contexts, 34% of development partners' funds that are disbursed to the public sector use PFM systems. In other contexts, 55% of development partners' funds use these systems.

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<sup>34</sup>. Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round show a strong positive relationship between the share of loans (in disbursements to the public sector) and use of country systems. On average, a 10 percentage-point increase in the loan share of a country is associated with a 4.9 percentage-point increase in the use of country systems, according to analysis based on 80 countries participating in the 2018 Monitoring Round for which data are available.

<sup>35</sup>. In addition, 64% of development co-operation funding is disbursed in loans in UMICs compared to 74% in lower middle-income countries, further contributing to the observed trend.

<sup>36</sup>. It should be noted that while the relationship between use of country systems and national income holds for SIDS – mainly because they are overwhelmingly UMICs or high-income countries – SIDS do not drive this trend. When SIDS are excluded from the analysis, a very similar pattern to that presented in Figure 2.17 is observed.

**Figure 2.18. Lower middle-income countries show highest use of country systems**

*Notes:* Shaded areas correspond to World Bank income classifications (gross national income per capita [GNI p.c.], 2017): low-income up to USD 1 006; lower middle-income up to USD 3 955; upper middle-income up to USD 12 235; high-income above this level. Circle surfaces are proportional to disbursements (grants and loans) of all development partners in a given country. The figure also plots a quadratic fit (statistically significant, R-squared: 0.32) showing a positive correlation between use of country systems and GNI p.c. (on average) a GNI of circa USD 1 752 and a negative correlation between use of country systems and GNI p.c. (on average) thereafter. Calculations are based on 80 partner countries participating in the 2018 Monitoring Round for which data on the use of country systems are available.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of use of country public financial management systems (Indicator 9b). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 58-61<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Coordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

### **Individual development partner use of country PFM systems varies substantially.**

Individual development partners' use of country PFM systems is not consistent across their partner countries. In other words, it is not that some partners always use countries' systems and others do not. Rather, development partners are making a choice on a case-by-case basis about when to use country PFM systems. For example, about half of providers used country systems for all of their disbursements to the public sector in at least one country, but also chose not to use country systems at all in at least one other of their partner countries.

**Development partners that have increased their funding to the public sector have also increased their use of country PFM systems.** The global increase in use of country PFM systems has been driven mostly by development partners that have increased the share of their co-operation that is disbursed to the public sector. In partner countries that experienced an increase in disbursements to the public sector between the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds, use of country PFM systems reached 57% in 2018 (compared to the



global average of 53%).<sup>37</sup> In 32 countries that participated in both rounds and that together represent more than USD 18 billion in public sector disbursements, changes in the share of funds disbursed to the public sector and use of country systems moved in concert. This could indicate that where development partners are firmly set on working with the public sector, they are also set on strengthening and using national systems.

**The longer development partners engage in partner countries, the more they tend to use these countries' PFM systems.** Building trust takes time. So does identifying both shared priorities and areas for potential, larger scale development co-operation programmes to justify initial transaction costs in starting to use country systems. Moreover, using country systems might require both the development partner and partner country to first better understand each other's relevant institutional arrangements and legal provisions. Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round suggest a positive correlation between the length of time that a development partner engages in a partner country and its likelihood to use that partner country's systems. Analysis also shows that use of country systems is increasing most strongly in the first few years of a development partner's engagement in a new partner country.<sup>38</sup> This suggests that use of country systems, among other things, benefits from building institutional knowledge and relies on practice and improvements over time.

#### **Box 2.7. Determinants of use of country public financial management systems**

While Global Partnership monitoring points to some factors that may shape development partner decisions to use partner country public financial management (PFM) systems, it is understood that many other considerations also influence the degree to which development partners use these systems. A 2014 study by the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI) looked at some of these factors. While it is not a comprehensive list, the following were identified as possible determinants of the use of country PFM systems by development partners:

- ▶ **Fiduciary factors.** Development partners continually cite fiduciary concerns – ensuring that development co-operation resources are used for the intended purpose and achieve value for money – as the primary consideration in using partner country PFM systems. This should mean that stronger systems result in increased use. However, and as noted in this chapter, there is no clear link between these two variables.
- ▶ **Non-fiduciary factors.** Research shows that development partners consider non-fiduciary factors when determining use of partner country PFM systems, including the strength of development policies, political stability and human rights situation.

<sup>37</sup>. The analysis is based on the 69 countries that participated in both the 2016 and the 2018 Monitoring Rounds and provided development partner data on use of country PFM systems and disbursements. The same trend is not observed for those countries in which there was an increase in the use of country PFM systems in 2016. This indicates that the observed difference is not driven by initial differences, but rather a change in disbursements to the public sector over time.

<sup>38</sup>. The duration of engagement between a partner country and a development partner is gauged by the number of years the development partner has reported disbursements to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System, going back from 2018 to the beginning of the reporting in that partner country or to the first break in reporting for more than two consecutive years.

- ▶ **Partner country development co-operation policies.** Research shows that when partner countries specifically highlight use of their PFM systems as the preferred approach for managing co-operation provided to the public sector, use of these systems increases.
- ▶ **Development partner capacity.** Partner country PFM systems vary, requiring that development partner staff build specific knowledge of an individual partner country's procedures and regulations.

Source: CABRI (2014<sup>[35]</sup>), *Towards a Greater Use of Country Systems in Africa: Recent Trends and Approaches*, <https://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/publications/towards-a-greater-use-of-country-systems-in-africa-recent-trends-and-approaches-synthesis-report>.

### Further action is needed to go beyond formally untying ODA to better untie in practice


**Bilateral development partners have consistently committed to untying their ODA.** Untying ODA means removing the legal and regulatory barriers to open competition for procurement funded by official development assistance. In practical terms, ODA is considered untied when the development partner does not attach geographical constraints on its use. There has been a formal recommendation on this matter by members of the DAC since 2001, when they agreed to untie ODA to the LDCs (OECD, 2019<sup>[36]</sup>). Since then, coverage of the Recommendation has been extended to more countries,<sup>39</sup> although it still does not cover all countries receiving ODA. This commitment to untie is based on the understanding that untying ODA increases the effective use of funds in terms of value for money and promotes partner country ownership and alignment, as this gives the recipient of the funds the freedom to procure goods and services from anywhere in the world, including from domestic stakeholders (OECD, 2019<sup>[37]</sup>).

**The share of untied ODA increased in the period from 2015 to 2017,<sup>40</sup> but progress has been uneven across development partners.** DAC members self-report to the OECD on the tying status of their ODA (i.e. whether each activity is tied, partially tied or untied). According to analyses of the latest reported data, the untied share of total DAC ODA increased from 76% in 2015 to 81% in 2017. When disaggregated by DAC members, however, the data show that progress has been uneven: 7 DAC members have fully untied their ODA; a further 9 members reported 90-100% of their ODA as untied; and 14 DAC members reported less than 90% of ODA is untied, including 7 that reported less than 70% of untied ODA (Figure 2.19). Since 2015, five DAC members increased their share of untied ODA by 20% or more. As new members join the DAC, they also start reporting on the Recommendation. Hungary, for example, joined in 2016 and reported 87% untied ODA in 2017.

<sup>39</sup>. The Recommendation on untying now extends to the LDCs, heavily indebted poor countries, other low-income countries and countries that are eligible only for financing from the International Development Association (IDA) ("IDA-only countries").

<sup>40</sup>. The latest available data at the time of writing are from 2017.


**Figure 2.19. Despite progress, not all DAC members have yet fully untied their official development assistance**



Note: Data exclude donor administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs. Total DAC includes EU institutions.  
Source: OECD (n.d.<sup>[38]</sup>), *Creditor Reporting System* (database), <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1>.

**Development partners' good global performance on untying aid is not trickling down to all partner countries.** Data on ODA commitments to the 56 partner countries that participated in both the 2016 and the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Rounds show an increase in the share of untied aid, from 76% in 2015 to 82% in 2017. Nevertheless, the proportion of untied ODA received by many partner countries decreased in the same time period (Figure 2.20). This was the case for a number of the LDCs, among them Guinea-Bissau and Laos, that experienced a drop of at least 10% in the share of untied ODA despite the LDCs being specifically covered by the DAC Recommendation on untying ODA. Overall, the share of untied ODA declined from 2015 to 2017 for 17 of the 43 LDCs that participated in the 2018 monitoring exercise; for most of the others, the share increased (25 countries) or remained the same (1 country).

**Figure 2.20 Official development assistance to some least developed countries is increasingly tied**



*Note:* \*Lao PDR refers to Lao People's Democratic Republic. The figure shows the 17 least developed countries that experienced a decrease in the share of untied official development assistance and that participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round.

**While DAC untying rates are generally improving, ODA-funded contracts are still largely awarded to suppliers based in the country of the development partner.** Reports on the DAC untying Recommendation not only track DAC members' commitments to untie ODA, but also provide analyses of the contracts awarded, including information about the countries in which the winning suppliers are based (OECD, 2017<sup>[39]</sup>) (OECD, 2018<sup>[40]</sup>). In 2016, about 40% of ODA-funded contracts were awarded to companies based in the development partner country, according to the 2018 (OECD<sup>[40]</sup>) report on the untying Recommendation. While this might be the natural result of competitive and open procurement, it is also possible that bidding processes are imbalanced in favour of the development partner market. The same report notes, for instance, that for nine DAC members,<sup>41</sup> 70% of contract volume was awarded to suppliers based in their own country. Awarding ODA-funded contracts to suppliers in partner countries helps to create jobs, generate income and build capacity in these countries. It also supports the main objective of ODA – to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. If contracts are won by suppliers based in the country of the development partner, partner countries will not reap these additional benefits produced by ODA.

**To increase its effectiveness, ODA that is *de jure* untied should remain *de facto* untied.** Research by Ellmers (2011<sup>[41]</sup>) found that development partners' procurement practices can

<sup>41</sup>. According to the 2018 "Report on the DAC untying recommendation" (OECD<sup>[40]</sup>), Table 6, the nine DAC members are Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

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make it difficult for some companies and individuals to win ODA-funded contracts and end up favouring specific suppliers or countries. Even when legally there are no geographical constraints, certain procurement practices may create uneven tender conditions and thus skew contract awards. Practical barriers that can hinder firms based in partner countries from winning contracts include language (e.g. tenders advertised only in English or only in the language of the development partner); communication channels (e.g. tenders advertised only on international platforms and not using media outlets from the partner country in question); and the size of contracts (e.g. large contracts that are not split into smaller, more manageable lots), among others (Meeks, 2018<sup>[42]</sup>). To fully realise the intended benefits of untied ODA, development partners need to ensure that their procurement practices do not create obstacles that potentially prevent suppliers from any country, including from partner countries, from winning ODA-funded contracts for the provision of goods and services.

### 3. Development partners are taking steps to reinforce a whole-of-society approach to development

**Realising the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) depends on collective efforts.** Indeed, the specific objective of SDG 17 is to strengthen global partnerships that bring together all parts of society, including national governments, civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector, the international community and other actors. The Nairobi Outcome Document (GPEDC, 2016<sup>[17]</sup>) also recognised the need for inclusive, multi-stakeholder partnerships and called for the contributions of all partners to be co-ordinated and complementary. In addition to working effectively with governments, development partners can support the participation of diverse actors through their development efforts. This can be done directly, by engaging these stakeholders in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of country strategies, programmes and projects, and it can be done indirectly, by promoting an environment that enables development actors to operate and to contribute to national development in their own right.

Through its multi-stakeholder platform, the Global Partnership champions a whole-of-society approach to sustainable development. While a variety of development actors are captured across several areas of Global Partnership monitoring, there is a dedicated indicator on a CSO-enabling environment and another on public-private dialogue. The results of these two indicators, as well as how other stakeholders contribute to development efforts, are discussed in Part I of this report. This chapter provides a brief overview of national stakeholders engaged in the preparation and implementation of development co-operation policies, strategies and programmes, followed by a more detailed assessment of one of the four areas of the CSO indicator, on how development partners are supporting civil society in partner countries.

Development partners' support to and engagement with CSOs is particularly important for SDG implementation. Assistance from development partners to CSOs can enable better organisation of citizens, create direct communication channels with elected representatives and support overall public engagement for citizens to hold their governments to account (Seery and Seghers, 2019<sup>[43]</sup>). While this chapter focuses on official development partners, other development actors such as philanthropies also play a crucial role in supporting CSOs in partner countries. For example, the Aga Khan Foundation partners with civil society to develop citizen-led organisations who seek inclusive solutions to common problems (Aga Khan Foundation, 2018<sup>[44]</sup>). In one such project, it created a social innovation lab with CSOs in Kenya to discuss social and economic challenges for the youth and collaboratively design solutions to address them.

The key findings of this chapter are:

- More inclusive and predictable engagement by development partners would allow for better quality inputs from national stakeholders. Of all the national stakeholders, CSOs are consulted the most. Nevertheless, CSOs in more than half of participating partner countries reported that consultations<sup>42</sup> with development partners are

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<sup>42</sup> The Global Partnership monitoring framework defines consultation as a process through which subjects or topics of interest are discussed within or across constituency groups. Consultations are more formal and interactive than dialogue. The objective of a consultation is to seek information,

episodic, unpredictable and not systematically conducted. Additionally, by engaging more systematically a diverse range of national actors, development partners would help to ensure that development efforts are country-owned and relevant to the needs and priorities of different parts of society.

- By raising the enabling environment as a regular agenda item in policy dialogues with partner country governments, development partners would enhance the conditions for civil society to operate and contribute to development in partner countries.. While most development partners reported that they include this issue in policy discussions, CSOs in the majority of partner countries find that it is raised by only some development partners and not regularly.
- Improving the quality of financial support to CSOs is critical. Development partners in a majority of partner countries consider their funding mechanisms to be predictable, transparent and accessible to a diversity of CSOs, but CSOs agreed with this assessment in fewer than 20% of partner countries. Moreover, CSOs consider funding received to be primarily driven by development partners' own interests and priorities. In addition to safeguarding core support to CSOs, development partners can also better co-ordinate, simplify and harmonise funding requirements among themselves to maximally enhance the environments in which CSOs operate.

### Development partners are not yet fully leveraging the contributions of diverse stakeholders in a systematic way that reflects a whole-of-society approach


**Development partners did not involve CSOs in the preparation of one-quarter of their country strategies, leaving room for more inclusive dialogue.** They involved the private sector to an even lesser extent (Figure 3.1). Engaging national stakeholders in preparing development partners' country strategies and partnership frameworks can play an important role in supporting development efforts that are owned by the whole of society. This helps to ensure the relevance of country strategies and projects to the needs and priorities of different parts of society in the partner country. In addition, inclusive engagement when planning development efforts can support collaborative and complementary efforts across the various development actors and maximise potential synergies. On average, development partners engaged CSOs in preparing 74% of the 831 country strategies reported in the 2018 Monitoring Round, the private sector in 54% of strategies, and other stakeholders (i.e. academia, trade unions, other development partners, experts, youth groups, etc.) in 60% of strategies. Among development partners, multilateral development banks (MDBs) consulted with non-governmental stakeholders the most, followed by UN agencies. Non-DAC bilateral partners engaged non-governmental stakeholders the least.

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advice and opinion. In any consultative process, the convener is not only gathering input, but sharing information as well. The organiser seeks to identify and clarify interests at stake, with the ultimate aim of developing a well-informed strategy or project that has a good chance of being supported and implemented. Providing and sharing information are seen as the foundation of an effective consultation process.

**Figure 3.1. Civil society organisations are consulted the most in preparing development partners’ country strategies**

Proportion of country strategies where non-governmental partner country stakeholders are engaged by development partners in their preparation, by partner type



*Notes:* Data presented in this figure relate to the 831 cases in which development partners have a country strategy or partnership framework. “Other stakeholders” mentioned by respondents include academia, trade unions, other development actors, experts and youth groups.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of development partners’ use of country-led results frameworks (Indicator 1a, Module 1). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**The perception among CSOs in most partner countries is that consultation with development partners is episodic, unpredictable and not systematically conducted.**

Over half of participating partner countries reported on the enabling environment for civil society (see Section 3.2 in Part I of this report). One of the four areas assessed as part of the enabling environment is the effectiveness of development partners’ work with CSOs.<sup>43</sup> Aggregate results for this area, as rated by governments, civil society and development partners, declined from 79% in the 2016 Monitoring Round to 49% in the 2018 round.<sup>44</sup> As shown in Figure 3.2, CSOs also reported on the extent to which development partners consult them in the design, implementation and monitoring of their development co-operation policies and programmes. In this regard, CSOs in 59% of participating partner countries reported that consultation with development partners is episodic, unpredictable and not systematically conducted. CSOs in these countries also reported that the agenda of these consultations is largely set by development partners and focuses on pre-determined

<sup>43</sup>. This area is Indicator 2, Module 3. The results from Module 3 are discussed across this chapter.


<sup>44</sup>. The relevant data sample is limited to the 36 countries that reported on CSO-enabling environments in both the 2016 and the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Rounds. For the 2018 round, the figure is the average result of individual responses of governments, civil society and development partners that reported on this area. For the 2016 round, the figure shows the responses provided by the government in consultation with civil society and development partners that reported on this area. Aspects covered in the assessment are discussed below in this chapter.



policies and priorities. In addition, CSOs in these countries reported that consultations are not co-ordinated adequately to include a diverse range of CSOs.

**Figure 3.2. Civil society organisations in most countries reported that development partner consultations are occasional and not inclusive**

Responses from development partners, civil society and governments on the extent to which development partners consult civil society on their development co-operation policies and programmes (share of countries)



*Notes:* Results include all views received from focal points of development partners, civil society and government who answered this question. Focal points were encouraged to consult with their constituencies to provide representative views. The complete wording of the response options is presented in the Characteristics of Practice, which can be downloaded at: <http://bit.ly/Indicator2CoP>.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of the environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2, Module 3, Question 3A). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 62-67<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).


**In addition to being consulted by development partners, CSOs and the private sector play a role as implementers of development co-operation projects.** Development partners value CSOs as partners because they bring expertise, grass roots knowledge and capacity to deliver services in places that development partners may not be able to reach on their own (OECD, 2012<sup>[45]</sup>). The proximity of CSOs to beneficiaries and their ability to react quickly in crises are also considered comparative advantages (Hedman and Mc Donnell, 2011<sup>[46]</sup>). Likewise, development partners work with the private sector to take advantage of its in-country knowledge, sectoral expertise and innovative solutions to address development challenges. Its capacity to mobilise additional resources is also cited as a reason to engage the private sector in project implementation (OECD, 2016<sup>[47]</sup>). CSOs and the private sector implement just under a quarter of development partners' projects assessed through the 2018 Monitoring Round (Box 3.1).<sup>45</sup>

<sup>45</sup> These projects were approved during 2017, but actual implementation and disbursements may be phased over subsequent years. The projects were reviewed in the context of assessing development partners' alignment to country objectives and results. Development partners' disbursements at country level also are included in the dataset and inform other indicators. Of these disbursements,

### Box 3.1. Civil society organisations and the private sector as project implementers

Civil society organisations are the main implementers of 15% of the more than 3 300 projects reported by development partners in the 2018 Monitoring Round; the private sector, national and international, is the main implementer of another 4% of projects. The government is responsible for implementing 35% of projects; the development partner for 19% of projects; and other public entities for 5% of projects. This disaggregation of implementing partners, illustrated in Figure 3.3, is consistent with the findings of the 2016 Monitoring Round.

Figure 3.3. Main implementers of the largest development projects approved in 2017



*Notes:* Development partners were asked to report on their six largest programmes or projects above USD 100 000 and approved during 2017 in the 86 participating countries. They reported a total of more than 3 300 projects. “Others” include universities, research centres, banks, financial intermediaries and private foundations.

*Source:* This figure draws on assessment of development partners’ use of country-led results frameworks (Indicator 1a, Module 2). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 46-52<sub>[6]</sub>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

## Development partners have an important role in supporting the enabling environment in which civil society organisations operate

**Development partners can support whole-of-society participation in development by promoting an enabling environment for CSOs to operate.** This can be done in many ways, including by: advocating for an enabling environment for CSOs as a key development concern in policy dialogue with governments; improving mechanisms to fund


35% were channelled to and through non-state actors including CSOs and the private sector, as discussed in Chapter 2.

CSOs in ways that strengthen their operations and increase their independence and responsiveness to community needs; and making support to CSOs more transparent to facilitate the co-ordination of operations and funding in partner countries.

**Development partners do not systematically raise the enabling environment for CSOs as an issue in policy dialogue with partner country governments.** Civil society organisations in a majority of countries (57%) reported that development partners only occasionally include elements of an enabling environment for CSOs in their policy dialogue with partner country governments. This view is also held by 48% of partner country governments (Figure 3.4). According to a recent study by Wood and Fällman (2019<sup>[48]</sup>), only 19 of the 30 DAC members reported that they engage in dialogue on the need for enabling environments with both partner country governments and in international and regional fora (see Box 3.4). Part I of this report discusses overall negative trends across several conditions for CSOs to operate and effectively contribute to development, supporting views of a contracting civic space (CIVICUS, 2019<sup>[49]</sup>). In view of these findings, there is room for development partners to take on a more systematic advocacy role to help strengthen the enabling environment for CSOs. Dialogue with partner country governments, for instance, provides the opportunity for development partners to stress the need to address constraints on the enabling environment and actively seek to identify measures to improve it. Development partners also can gear their government-to-government support to reinforcing partner country institutions that protect and uphold the CSO-enabling environment.

**Figure 3.4. Development partners and partner country governments do not systematically discuss promoting a CSO-enabling environment**

Responses from development partners, civil society and governments on the extent to which the promotion of an enabling environment for CSOs is an agenda item in development partners' policy dialogue with the government (share of countries)




*Notes:* Results include all views received from focal points of development partners, civil society and government who answered this question. Focal points were encouraged to consult with their constituencies to provide representative views. The complete wording of the response options is presented in the Characteristics of Practice, which can be downloaded at: <http://bit.ly/Indicator2CoP>.

Source: Figure draws on assessment of the environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2, Module 3, Question 3B). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 62-67<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**The vast majority of CSOs consider that development partners' funding mechanisms are driven primarily by these partners' own interests and priorities.** As highlighted in the Busan Partnership agreement, "*CSOs play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, in promoting rights-based approaches, in shaping development policies and partnerships, and in overseeing their implementation*". The Nairobi Outcome Document restated the essential role of civil society as an independent partner. Development partners have the opportunity to strengthen CSO operations and increase CSOs' independence, diversity and responsiveness to community needs and priorities through their financial support. CSOs in 82% of partner countries reported that funding priorities and mechanisms are exclusively driven by development partners' own programming interests or tied directly to implementation of their own priorities (Figure 3.5). This suggests that those CSOs receiving funding from development partners consider themselves more as implementers than as equal partners and actors in their own right able to bring knowledge on local needs and priorities. As discussed in Part I of this report, CSOs expressed similar views when funding comes from other, larger CSOs and from international CSOs. These perspectives are particularly relevant given current trends, whereby funding provided directly to local CSOs is declining and funding channelled through local and other types of CSOs is increasing (Box 3.3). An example of how to strengthen CSOs as independent development actors in their own right is organisational support in the form of core funding targeted to a CSO's own objectives and programmes. Co-ordination, simplification and harmonisation of funding requirements among development partners also constitute good practice that contributes to reduced transaction costs and increased access for a diversity of CSOs (Box 3.2 discusses Samoa, a case in practice).

**Figure 3.5. Civil society organisations and governments in most partner countries consider development partners' funding mechanisms to be focused on implementing the development partners' own programming priorities**

Responses from development partners, civil society and governments on the extent to which development partner financial support maximises sustainable engagement of partner country CSOs in development (share of countries)



*Notes:* CSO: civil society organisation. Results include all views received from focal points of development partners, civil society and government who answered this question. Focal points were encouraged to consult with their constituencies to provide representative views. The complete wording of the response options, and detail on funding mechanisms, is presented in the Characteristics of Practice, which can be downloaded at: <http://bit.ly/Indicator2CoP>.

*Source:* This figure draws on assessment of the environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2, Module 3, Question 3C). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 62-67<sup>[6]</sup>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

### Box 3.2. Co-ordinating support to civil society organisations in Samoa

The Civil Society Support Programme (CSSP) was designed to strengthen Samoan civil society organisations (CSOs) and facilitate their participation in the sustainable delivery of social and economic benefits. The programme set out two objectives.

- Objective 1: Providing an efficient and accountable funding mechanism that enables CSOs to implement effective and innovative development initiatives in response to the priority needs of vulnerable communities.
- Objective 2: Serving as a responsive resource for civil society development in Samoa by building CSO capacity, strengthening partnerships, promoting alliances, providing information and conducting research.

In extending its support to CSOs, the CSSP provides a single point of contact and a common set of application forms and reporting requirements. It further provides for CSO

capacity building in project and organisational management and in proposal writing. Grantees are offered technical assistance to improve the implementation of their projects within a sustainable framework. The CSSP additionally supports information exchange among community organisations on their projects and best practices.

The CSSP is governed and managed by the government of Samoa, civil society representatives and development partners, including the Australian government through AusAID, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the European Union. The CSSP allows for improved co-ordination, simplification and harmonisation of funding requirements. It also contributes to reducing transaction costs and increases access to funding for a diverse range of CSOs.

Source: Government of Samoa (Government of Samoa, n/d<sub>[50]</sub>), [www.cssp.gov.ws/about-us](http://www.cssp.gov.ws/about-us).


### Box 3.3. Disparities in funding for civil society organisations

Although civil society organisations (CSOs) are receiving more financial support from development partners than ever before, funds to CSOs based in partner countries have decreased. According to recent OECD statistics on official development assistance (ODA) to CSOs (OECD, 2018<sub>[51]</sub>), DAC funds to and through CSOs increased from USD 17 billion to USD 20 billion from 2010 to 2017 (Figure 3.6). ODA *to* CSOs comprises **core contributions** that are programmed by the CSO; ODA *through* CSOs is **earmarked funding** that is channelled through CSOs to implement development partner-initiated projects.

This overall increase, however, is not equally reflected in the different forms of assistance or in the types of organisations. ODA through CSOs has increased for all types of CSOs, most notably for international ones<sup>1</sup>. ODA to CSOs decreased overall for partner country-based CSOs<sup>2</sup>. While ODA to CSOs increased for international CSOs, the biggest increase was for CSOs that are based in development partner countries<sup>3</sup>.

International CSOs often work with CSOs based in partner countries, so an increase in funds to international CSOs could translate into an increase in funds to partner country-based CSOs. However, these partnerships often are not equitable and are typically based on the projects and interests defined by the financing CSO (see Chapter 3 in Part I of this report). As a result, such funding does not directly increase the ability of CSOs based in partner countries to implement their own programmes in response to the needs and priorities of the local communities they serve.

**Figure 3.6. DAC assistance to civil society organisations (CSOs) (core) and through CSOs (earmarked), 2010-17**



*Notes:* Official development assistance (ODA) to CSOs refers to core contributions and contributions to programmes. These funds are programmed by the CSOs. ODA through CSOs (earmarked funding) refers to funds channelled through CSOs and other private bodies to implement development partner-initiated projects.


*Source:* OECD (n.d.<sup>[38]</sup>), *Creditor Reporting System* (database), <https://stats.oecd.org>.

1. International CSOs are organised on an international level. International organisations may act as umbrella organisations with affiliations in several development partner and/or partner countries.
2. Partner country-based CSOs are organised at the national level, and are based and operated in ODA-eligible countries.
3. CSOs based in the country of development partners are organised at the national level, and are based and operated either in the country of the development partner providing the funds or another development partner country.

**More detailed information on development partners' support to CSOs would increase transparency and accountability towards citizens.** Development partners in 40% of partner countries reported that they make available detailed information (sectors, programmes, objectives, financing, results) on their support to CSOs. However, CSOs in only 11% of partner countries agreed that this is the case. In 50% of countries, CSOs reported that only some development partners make information available on their support to CSOs at aggregate level, and without activity-level or beneficiary-level information. Governments in 11% of countries and CSOs in 14% of countries reported that they believe information is not available on the majority of development partners' support to international and domestic CSOs working in the country. Transparency regarding flows for CSOs is important to enhance the accountability of CSOs in partner countries towards their citizens. One option is reporting information about financial support to CSOs to national or international online platforms. Such information – including details on sectors, objectives, geographic locations, financing and results – also can be made available through development partners' websites. In Albania, for example, most development partners make information about their support to CSOs publicly available on different platforms such as social media, publications and their own websites.

**Figure 3.7. More transparent information on development partners' support to civil society organisations is needed**

Responses from development partners, civil society and governments on the extent to which development partners make available information about their CSO support (share of countries)



*Notes:* Detailed information on support for civil society organisations includes sectors, objectives, geographic location, financing and results, both on international platforms and on development partners' websites. Results include all views received from focal points of development partners, civil society and government who answered this question. Focal points were encouraged to consult with their constituencies to provide representative views. The complete wording of the response options is presented in the Characteristics of Practice, which can be downloaded at: <http://bit.ly/Indicator2CoP>.

*Source:* This figure draws on assessment of the environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2, Module 3, Question 3D). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 62-67<sub>[6]</sub>), *2018 Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

#### **Box 3.4. Study on how DAC members work with civil society**

Wood and Fällman, in a paper published by the OECD (Wood and Fällman, 2019<sub>[48]</sub>), find that, overall, DAC members are striving to implement the OECD's Partnering with Civil Society recommendations (OECD, 2012<sub>[45]</sub>). The new study explores DAC members' policies regarding civil society, including on consultation; funding; and approaches to monitoring, evaluation and accountability, and it will inform up-to-date guidance to be developed in collaboration with DAC members and other stakeholders. The study's conclusions, moreover, dovetail with results from the 2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Round. Their mutually reinforcing findings on how development partners work with civil society point to areas in need of attention going forward.

All 30 DAC members participated in a survey conducted in conjunction with the study. One of its findings was that all DAC members consult with CSOs at headquarters level regarding their civil society policies, and that 20 members have a regular and systematic consultation process in place. Only 7 members report having regular and systematic



consultations at partner country level, although 20 members said ad hoc consultations take place at partner country level.

DAC members report that they promote an enabling environment for CSOs in different ways. Consistent with findings from the 2018 Monitoring Round (Figure 3.4), 19 of the 30 members report that they engage in dialogue on the need for enabling environments both with partner country governments and in international or regional fora. Among the additional means they pursue to promote enabling environments in partner countries are supporting civil society in countries where environments are disabling (23); supporting CSOs to strengthen their effectiveness and accountability (22); and encouraging partner country governments to engage in dialogue with CSOs (18). A less frequently used method, reported by only seven members, is self-assessment to better understand how their CSO support may indirectly contribute to disabling environments.

In terms of transparency about their CSO support, the study finds that DAC members tend to favour tools such as annual reports to the public and to DAC member parliaments (15). Some DAC members have established open access databases of their CSO support (10). But, in line with the 2018 monitoring results, these are not necessarily disaggregated by partner country. Other members participate in open access databases covering CSO support in specific partner countries (6).

For a majority of DAC members (22), a main objective of their work with CSOs is strengthening civil society in partner countries, including to enable CSOs as independent development actors. The most-cited objective in working with CSOs was programme implementation in service delivery (23); 18 members reported programme implementation in human rights and democratisation was reported by 18 DAC members. More members use funding mechanisms such as calls for proposals or project and programme financing than use core support, even though core support is arguably more conducive to supporting CSO-defined initiatives and thus to enabling CSOs as development actors in their own right.

*Source:* Wood, J. and K. Fällman (2019<sub>[48]</sub>), “Enabling civil society: Select survey findings”, <https://doi.org/10.1787/54903a6a-en>.

#### 4. Development partners are strengthening transparency of development co-operation information as an important step to enhance accountability

**Transparency and accountability are interlinked and integral elements that help to ensure that development efforts are conducted efficiently and effectively, thereby maximising results.** Information on past, current and future efforts helps to hold officials and institutions accountable for their performance and how they use development resources. Access to high-quality and timely information on development co-operation helps governments to plan and manage resources for results; it also helps increasingly diverse development partners to co-ordinate their support and thus avoid fragmentation and duplication of efforts. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognises their importance, calling (Paragraph 58) for increased transparency and mutual accountability of development co-operation (UN, 2015<sub>[15]</sub>).

Development partners have continued to commit to making information on their development co-operation publicly available and to strengthening their participation in mutual accountability mechanisms.<sup>46</sup> This chapter examines development partner progress, both through reporting to global and country-level systems to track development co-operation information and through participation in country-level mutual accountability efforts.

The key findings of this chapter are:

- More development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly available. Since 2016, the number of development partners<sup>47</sup> reporting to the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) has increased, signalling broadening uptake of the Busan commitment for transparent and accountable development co-operation.
- Challenges persist in the timeliness of reporting and in providing forward-looking information. While development partners' reporting on development co-operation is more comprehensive overall compared to the 2016 Monitoring Round, timely reporting and provision of forward-looking information are not progressing evenly across different transparency standards. This points to the need for a reinvigorated commitment to transparency – not only to provide the information, but to provide it in a way that is most useful to inform development efforts.
- Development partners at country level view mutual accountability assessments as important in improving effectiveness. Development partners perceive mutual accountability assessments as a key component in improving the ways of working

<sup>46</sup>. The commitment to making information publicly available is contained in Paragraph 23 of the Busan Partnership agreement and Paragraph 77 of the Nairobi Outcome Document. The commitment to strengthen participation in mutual accountability mechanisms is contained in Paragraph 25 of the Busan Partnership agreement and Paragraph 77 of the Nairobi Outcome Document.

<sup>47</sup>. As indicated in the introduction of this report, “development partner” refers to official agencies, including state and local governments, or their executive agencies.

at country level, signalling the need to continue to invest in mutual accountability frameworks even as the development co-operation landscape changes.

### More development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly available

**A greater number of development partners are making information on development co-operation publicly available.** The assessment of transparency of development co-operation is grounded in development partner reporting to three global information systems and standards: the CRS, the OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey (FSS) and the IATI.<sup>48</sup> (Box 4.1 provides additional details on these systems, their standards and the measurement approach.) Overall, the number of development partners reporting to one or more of these three systems and standards has increased, driven by new providers reporting to the CRS (a 5% increase in development partner reporting since 2016, from 91 to 96) and to the IATI (a 35% increase, from 43 to 58).<sup>49</sup> The number of development partners reporting to the FSS (44) remained the same from 2016 to 2018.

#### Box 4.1. Global Partnership measures of transparency

As noted, Global Partnership monitoring of the transparency of development co-operation relies on assessment of the extent to which information is made publicly available through each of the three reporting systems and standards. These systems and standards are recognised in the Busan Partnership agreement (Paragraph 23) for their complementary strengths, with the Creditor Reporting System and Forward Spending Survey providing statistical information and the International Aid Transparency Initiative providing management information.

**OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS):** Records activity-level development co-operation flows for statistical, accountability and monitoring purposes.

**OECD-DAC Forward Spending Survey (FSS):** Records development partners' development co-operation plans for greater predictability.

**International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI):** An open-data standard that allows publishers to provide information about their development co-operation activities.

Evaluation of progress in increasing transparency relies on assessments produced by the secretariats of each of the three systems and standards. The assessment methodology differs across systems and standards, but all these methodologies are constructed around agreed dimensions of transparency. These include three dimensions agreed in the Busan


<sup>48</sup>. The results for transparency (Indicator 4) of the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds capture the latest assessments available at the time of reporting for each of the respective rounds. CRS data for the 2018 round refer to assessment on reporting to the CRS in 2017; CRS data for the 2016 round refer to assessment on reporting to the CRS in 2014. FSS data for the 2018 round refer to the 2018 survey; FSS data for the 2016 round refer to the 2015 survey. IATI data for the 2018 round refer to scores extracted from the online platform in December 2018; IATI data for the 2016 round refer to scores extracted in May 2016.

<sup>49</sup>. The sample of 96 development partners reporting to the CRS includes only official development partners among the 122 that report to the CRS. The 58 development partners reporting to the IATI only include official development partners; over 1 000 organisations have published to the platform.

Partnership agreement – timeliness, comprehensiveness and provision of forward-looking information – and the additional two dimensions of data accuracy and public availability, as part of the methodology agreed in 2016.<sup>1</sup> Figure 4.1 shows the dimensions assessed for each system and standard. Development partners' scores in dimensions are based on the information they provide to these systems; each is then assigned an overall percentage score for transparency. To facilitate interpretation of scores, the Global Partnership presents the assessments using a four-tiered scale of excellent, good, fair and needs improvement.<sup>2</sup>

The above-noted increase in the number of development partners reporting to one or more of the three systems and standards resulted in a 32% increase in assessments from the 2016 to the 2018 Monitoring Round.<sup>3</sup>

**Figure 4.1. Dimensions of transparency assessed across the three reporting systems and standards**




*Notes:* 1. This dimension (publicly accessible) for the FSS was added as part of the revision to the monitoring methodology in the lead up to the 2016 Monitoring Round. While the CRS and the IATI, by default, are publicly available, the results of the FSS are not. The Global Partnership transparency assessment therefore includes development providers' willingness to disclose their spending plans as a dimension. 2. The weights of different dimensions vary by assessment. Given that the underlying methodologies are different, the Global Partnership tiered scale is not directly comparable across systems. Details on the scoring can be found in the *Technical Companion Document* (GPEDC, 2018<sup>[8]</sup>). The technical details of the specific methodologies for these three assessments can be accessed at: <http://bit.ly/ind4final>. 3. Global Partnership monitoring presents transparency assessment scores by country. In the cases of Canada, EU institutions, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, multiple government institutions publish individually to the IATI. For comparability purposes, the average assessment for these is presented at government level (weighted by the size of the specific development co-operation programme).

**Overall levels of transparency of development co-operation remain unchanged.** Results from the 2018 Monitoring Round are similar to those from the 2016 round, with 27% of the assessments across all three global information systems and standards rated as excellent (Figure 4.2). One-third (38%) of development partners received a score of excellent in at least one of the three assessments. Three-fourths (76%) of development

partners are rated as good at least once.<sup>50</sup> The African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Canada, EU institutions, the Global Environment Facility, the Nordic Development Fund, Sweden, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children’s Fund have excellent scores in at least two of the three assessments. However, transparency trends across systems and standards differ. More development partners reporting to the CRS and the IATI obtained a score of excellent in the 2018 round than in the 2016 round (Figure 4.33 and Figure 4.5).<sup>51</sup> In contrast, fewer development partners obtained scores of excellent on their reporting to the FSS in the 2018 round compared to the numbers in the 2016 round<sup>52</sup> (Figure 4.4). To highlight an example of good practice, Norway has improved the quality of its reporting to each of the three systems and standards since 2016. This is the result of its increasing emphasis on high-quality reporting to the OECD-DAC systems and of higher frequency of reporting to the IATI.

**Figure 4.2. Transparency of development co-operation remains steady**



*Notes:* Percentages for 2018 are based on 176 instances in which a development partner appears in an assessment across all three transparency systems and standards. Percentages for 2016 are based on 133 instances.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of the transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 74-78<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

<sup>50</sup>. In the 2016 Monitoring Round, 39% of development partners obtained a score of excellent at least once and 72% obtained a score of at least good at least once. It should be noted that in the 2018 Monitoring Round, the total number of development partners for which transparency assessments are available increased from 61 to 94. When comparing the same set of 61 development partners for which assessments are available in both the 2016 and 2018 rounds, results are similar: 41% of development partners had at least one “excellent” score and 72% had at least one good” score.

<sup>51</sup>. For development partners for which the CRS and IATI transparency scores were available for the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds, data confirm that positive trends are linked to improvements made by these development partners over time and are not driven by the good performance of development partners reporting to the two systems and standards for the first time.

<sup>52</sup>. This negative trend is confirmed for the subset of development partners for which the FSS assessment was available in both the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds.

## Information on development co-operation is more comprehensive, but development partners struggle to provide timely reporting and forward-looking information

**The comprehensiveness of reported information on development co-operation has improved.** Among the three dimensions of transparency highlighted in the Busan Partnership agreement, the most notable progress has been made in the comprehensiveness of information reported to the FSS and the IATI. For 42% of development partners reporting to the FSS, information reported is more complete than it was in 2016. Between the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds, 62% of development partners increased the comprehensiveness of information published to the IATI, although comprehensiveness declined for 30% of development partners. Only 14% of development partners reported more complete information to the CRS since the 2016 round, while 21% reported less complete information.

**The timeliness of information differs across systems.** For the CRS and the FSS, timeliness of information reported decreased between the 2016 and 2018 Monitoring Rounds, with more development partners reporting in a less timely manner in this area.<sup>53</sup> However, encouraging progress has been made in the timeliness of reporting to the IATI by development partners that published their information to the platform in both 2016 and 2018; in these cases, 59% development partners – mainly DAC members and UN agencies – improved the timeliness of their reporting.<sup>54</sup>

**Accelerated efforts are needed to make forward-looking development co-operation information available.** The assessment for the FSS (which focuses specifically on forward-looking information) shows an overall decline, with a lower proportion of development partners (55%) ranked as good or excellent than in the 2016 round (66%). This is a reversal of the positive trend seen from 2014 to 2016. Furthermore, while many development partners (45%) publishing to the IATI improved their forward-looking data provision, the least progress was reported in this dimension within the IATI assessment, as was the case in 2016. These findings confirm results on development partners' limited provision of forward-looking expenditure plans. The consistent shortfall in development partners' provision of forward-looking information on their development co-operation, demonstrated by both these findings, can have an impact on partner countries' ability to effectively plan and budget for development activities. In addition to comprehensive, timely and forward-looking information, the information reported should be presented in a relevant and accessible manner for decision makers. One example of how these systems and standards are adapting to the demands of the 2030 Agenda is discussed in Box 4.2.

### Box 4.2. Creditor Reporting System reporting has a new Sustainable Development Goals focus

In 2018, members of the OECD-DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics agreed to create a new Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) focus field in the Creditor Reporting System

<sup>53</sup>. Timeliness declined for 36% of development partners reporting to the CRS and for 29% of those reporting to the FSS; timeliness improved for 19% of development partners reporting to the CRS and for 13% of those reporting to the FFS.

<sup>54</sup>. This trend is not caused by new development partners being assessed and is consistent when the analysis is restricted to those development partners for which scores are available for 2016 and 2018 monitoring exercises.

(CRS). This SDG data field identifies the specific SDGs and/or targets to which development co-operation projects intend to contribute, thus permitting development co-operation in support of the implementation and monitoring of the 2030 Agenda to be tracked. The SDG focus is tracked at target level, with the possibility to report at goal level for a transitional period. Reporting at target level allows greater granularity and permits targets from different goals to be combined to cover cross-cutting topics.


Reporting on the SDG focus is on a voluntary basis and started in 2019 for reporting on 2018 flows. Data collected through the SDG data field can be used to analyse the distribution of official development assistance (ODA) by SDGs and SDG targets, and examine ODA commitments for a specific set of targets. By tracking the achievement of SDG targets via specific indicators, reporting to the CRS could help to establish a link between inputs and outputs or outcomes, opening up new possibilities to use the data to assess and ultimately improve the effectiveness of development finance flows.

Source: OECD (OECD DAC, 2018<sup>[52]</sup>), “Proposal to include an SDG focus field in the CRS database”, [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT\(2018\)41/REV1/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2018)41/REV1/en/pdf).

## Progress in strengthening the transparency of development co-operation is inconsistent

**Multilateral development partners perform well in all three global assessments.** In the 2018 Monitoring Round, half of multilateral partners achieve a rating of excellent in the assessment of information reported to CRS. Among multilaterals, UN agencies are the top performers, with 57% rated as excellent in the CRS transparency rating. Likewise, multilateral development partners perform well in the FSS and the IATI assessments. Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show results of assessments of the information reported to each system. The assessment of each system was carried out against different criteria and adapted to the purpose and technical features of each system respectively. Therefore, the information shown in the three graphs is not directly comparable.


**Figure 4.3. Reporting to Creditor Reporting System has improved for a proportion of development partners**



*Notes:* Reporting to the CRS by bilateral development partners and multilateral organisations is different and categories for the transparency indicator differ in some cases. For example, multilateral organisations do not report on tying status. Figures for bilateral partners are based on 36 observations; figures for multilateral partners are based on 35 observations.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of the transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4), which is based on the data provided by the secretariat of the DAC. Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 74-78<sup>(23)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).


**Figure 4.4. Forward-looking reporting is declining**



*Note:* Figures for bilateral partners are based on 26 observations; figures for multilateral partners are based on 18 observations.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of the transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4), which is based on the data provided by the secretariat of the DAC. Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 74-78<sup>(23)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Figure 4.5. Improvements in reporting to the International Aid Transparency Initiative are driven by multilateral partners**



*Note:* Figures for bilateral partners are based on 21 observations; figures for multilateral partners are based on 36 observations.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of the transparency of development co-operation (Indicator 4), which is based on the data provided by the secretariat of the DAC. Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 74-78<sup>(23)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).



**The scores of more than one-third of development partners declined in at least one of the three systems between the last two Monitoring Rounds.** Scores improved in at least one system for half of the development partners for which assessments are available for both the 2016 and 2018 exercises, but declined in at least one system in this period for 38% of these development partners. This finding indicates that progress in making information on development co-operation publicly available requires continued attention and effort. Box 4.3 shows examples of how two development partners are making strides in this area.

#### **Box 4.3. Using development co-operation data: Good practice examples**

In early 2019, the European Commission launched the EU Aid Explorer, a user-friendly online tool that helps external stakeholders to access and use development co-operation data from EU institutions and the 28 EU member states. The tool brings together, on a single platform, data produced internally by the European Commission, data reported by member states to the OECD Creditor Reporting System and data published to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). The EU Aid Explorer aims to make EU development co-operation data more transparent, accessible and usable to development partners, partner countries and the public. By consolidating information on who does what and where, the tool is an essential support to EU joint programming and action in partner countries. It also helps EU institutions and member states to increase the quantity and quality of EU publishing to the IATI through mutual learning.

Another essential tool is the United Nation's data cube initiative. Initially focused on UN system-wide funding data, the initiative is a response to calls for increased transparency among UN entities that emerged from the 2016 quadrennial comprehensive policy reviews, the 2017 report on the repositioning of the UN development system and the 2019 UN funding compact. The first phase of the data cube initiative was completed in October 2018, with the approval of data standards for reporting of UN system-wide financial information. In developing the data standards, efforts were made to align to international data standards, including those of OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the IATI. UN data standards entered into effect on 1 January 2019; the transition period will run until 31 December 2021, after which the standards are to be fully adopted. It is expected that, over time, the data standards will be used by all UN system entities in their reporting of financial information to the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, the IATI and the OECD DAC.

**Global transparency efforts must be matched with country-level reporting.** Availability of information on development co-operation at global level is a complement to information provided and collected at the country level. As seen in Box 4.2 in Part I of this report, most partner countries (96%) have one or more information management system in place to collect information on development co-operation. Data from the 2018 Monitoring Round show that, on average, 83% of development partners report to those systems, but that reporting lacks consistency and quality (UNDP, 2018<sub>[53]</sub>). Comprehensive and timely reporting to these country-level systems is essential to ensure that partner country governments, their development partners and other stakeholders at country level have the information they need for effective development planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation (Box 4.4).

#### **Box 4.4. The International Aid Transparency Initiative aims to increase country-level data availability and usability**

Global transparency systems are not considered to be core elements of national data ecosystems. Country-level stakeholders report difficulties in accessing the data on development co-operation that

they need to inform decision making; systems are difficult to use; and globally available data are incorrect or inconsistent with data reported to country systems. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) aims to overcome these challenges by increasing the availability and usability of quality development co-operation information at country level. Some examples of its work are the following:

- In **Ghana**, the IATI supported awareness-raising events and the development of a global guide to the different tools available for accessing and using IATI data.
- Development Gateway and UNICEF, both IATI members, worked with Development Initiatives and the governments of **Madagascar** and **Senegal** to develop a curriculum and tools to provide training in the use of IATI data alongside country-level information management systems. This successful project funded and trained two fellows to work with government counterparts in the countries' Ministry of Finance to institutionalise the IATI standard in their use of aid management platforms.
- Country case studies commissioned as part of the IATI's strategic planning process highlighted challenges with data use in **Malawi** and **Somalia**. These also pointed to the need to strengthen advocacy, particularly at subnational levels, and extend capacity-building efforts to bring about a significant increase in data use.

### The majority of development partners consider country-level mutual accountability assessments to be effective


**Transparency is further strengthened through mutual accountability mechanisms, which are rapidly adapting to the evolving development co-operation landscape.** Mutual accountability mechanisms are made up of multiple, reinforcing components that can help to enhance transparency and accountability at country level (see Box 4.1 in Part I of this report). These mechanisms go beyond information on development co-operation that is reported to global and country-level transparency systems, allowing partner country governments, their development partners and other stakeholders to hold each other accountable for their country-level commitments – not only in terms of what co-operation is provided, but also how it is provided. Partner country governments are updating their mutual accountability mechanisms, both policy frameworks for development co-operation and mutual assessments to track progress towards effective development co-operation, to reflect the growing diversity and range of development partners and co-operation modalities.

**The vast majority of development partners reported that mutual accountability assessments are either somewhat or very effective in informing the ways of working in the partner country.** In 2018, Global Partnership monitoring asked development partners for the first time to report on their perceptions of the inclusiveness and value added of mutual assessments. This reporting was in addition to assessment of the quality of mutual accountability mechanisms as a whole (see Chapter 4 in Part I of this report). Of the 117 development partners reporting, 86 responded that they took part in one or more mutual accountability assessments across partner countries in the two years prior to the monitoring exercises. In 77% of mutual assessments, development partners reported that both the national government and other development partners were involved (Figure 4.6). Development partners reported that mutual accountability assessments in 88% of cases were either somewhat or very effective in informing the ways of working in the country to improve ownership, inclusiveness and focus on results and increase transparency and accountability (Figure 4.7). This finding points to the continued importance of mutual

accountability frameworks as a way to strengthen the effectiveness of development co-operation and increase development impact amidst a rapidly changing landscape.

**Figure 4.6. Development partners report strong inclusiveness of mutual assessments**

Stakeholder involvement in mutual accountability assessments, as reported by development partners




*Notes:* This figure illustrates the level of inclusiveness of mutual accountability assessments reported on by development partners. The results show that in more than two-thirds of these mutual accountability assessments, the government and other development partners were involved in the assessment exercise.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of complementary information collected from development partners on mutual accountability at country level (Indicator 7). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 38-40<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

**Figure 4.7. Development partners view mutual assessments as effective**

The majority of development partners reporting on mutual assessments consider them effective



*Note:* Development partners were asked to report on the extent to which they find mutual assessments effective in informing the ways of working in the country to improve ownership, inclusiveness and focus on results, and increase transparency and accountability.

*Source:* Figure draws on assessment of complementary information collected from development partners on mutual accountability at country level (Indicator 7). Further information is available in GPEDC (2018, pp. 38-40<sup>(6)</sup>), *2018 Global Partnership Monitoring Guide for National Co-ordinators*, [http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018\\_Monitoring\\_Guide\\_National\\_Coordinator.pdf](http://effectivecooperation.org/pdf/2018_Monitoring_Guide_National_Coordinator.pdf).

## Annex A

The Global Partnership monitoring exercise tracks country-level progress in implementing the four internationally agreed effective development co-operation principles: 1) country ownership; 2) a focus on results; 3) inclusive partnerships; and 4) transparency and mutual accountability to one another. The biennial exercise reports on a monitoring framework that consists of ten indicators that focus on strengthening developing countries' systems; increasing the transparency and predictability of development co-operation; enhancing gender equality; and supporting greater involvement of civil society, parliaments and the private sector in development efforts. These ten indicators, and how they inform different chapters of Progress Report, are listed in Table A.1.

**Table A.1. Global Partnership indicators and where to find analysis on indicator results in the 2019 Progress Report**

### Part I: How partner countries are promoting effective partnerships

#### Chapter 2: Partner country government leadership has advanced national development aspirations

- Quality of national development strategies and results frameworks (Indicator 1b).
- The country strengthens its public financial management systems (Indicator 9a).
- Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight (Indicator 6).
- The country has systems to track and make public allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment (Indicator 8, SDG 5.c).

#### Chapter 3: Partner country governments can enable more meaningful engagement to maximise a whole-of-society approach

- Creates an enabling environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2).
- Quality of public-private dialogue (Indicator 3).

#### Chapter 4: Mutual accountability mechanisms are adapting to an evolving development landscape

- Quality of mutual accountability mechanisms (Indicator 7).
- Transparent information on development co-operation is reported at country level (Indicator 4).

### Part II: How development partners are promoting effective, country-led partnerships

#### Chapter 2: Walking the talk: development partners are not fully facilitating country leadership over development efforts

- Development partners use national development strategies and results frameworks (Indicator 1a, SDG 17.15).
- Annual predictability of development co-operation (Indicator 5a).

- Medium-term predictability of development co-operation (Indicator 5b).
- Development co-operation is included in budgets subject to parliamentary oversight (Indicator 6).
- Development partners use public financial management systems (Indicator 9b).
- Aid is untied (Indicator 10).

### Chapter 3: Development partners are taking steps to reinforce a whole-of-society approach to development


- Create an enabling environment for civil society organisations (Indicator 2).

### Chapter 4: Development partners are strengthening transparency of development co-operation information as an important step to enhanced accountability

- Transparent information on development co-operation is published at global level (Indicator 4).
- Development partners' perspective on mutual accountability mechanisms at country level (Indicator 7).

With regard to the response rates to each of the ten Global Partnership indicators, not all countries responded to or provided data on each aspect covered by the monitoring exercise. A total of 86 partner countries participated in the 2018 Monitoring Round, but the proportion of participating partner countries that responded varies across the 10 indicators. Figure A.1 presents an overview of the response rates on each indicator.

**Figure A.1. Coverage of the country-level indicators in the 2018 Monitoring Round**



*Notes:* The dark blue bars refer to indicators that are reported directly by the participating country. Light blue bars refer to indicators reported by the participating country with inputs from and/or in consultation with development partners and domestic stakeholders. Indicator 4 above refers to the country-level transparency assessment. Indicator 4 (global-level transparency) and Indicator 10 are not included in the figure because they are not collected at country level.

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